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Abstract 
Today’s world is an interconnected global village. Communication and business 
transactions are increasingly conducted in non-native languages. Literature suggests that biases 
are present when communicating in non-native languages; that a truth bias is present in first 
language communication, and a lie bias in second language communication. Less than 10% of 
South Africa’s population identifies with English, the lingua franca of the country, as a first 
language.  Not much research in the presence of bias in second language communication has 
been published in the South African multi-lingual context. This study evaluated the presences of 
bias within deception frameworks such as the Truth Default State and the veracity effect. 
This study investigated whether deception detection can be improved by modifying the 
conditions under which statements are given by placing statement providers under cognitive 
load. The accuracy of veracity judgment language profiling software, LIWC2015, using 
published deception language profiles was compared against the results of the participating 
veracity judges. 
Results of the study were mixed. It was consistent with extant literature in a presence of a 
truth bias overall, but mixed in terms of a lie bias.  The results supported the Truth Default 
Theory and veracity effect frameworks. LIWC2015 performed marginally better than human 
judges in evaluating veracity. 
Keywords: Lie Bias, Truth Bias, Deception Detection, Cognitive Load, Veracity 
Assessment.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction and Background 
Deception for the most part is an innocuous daily act of human existence and human 
interaction and or communication. For the most part, getting away with deceit has limited 
consequences. There are incidents in which getting away with the deceit or lie would have 
serious consequences for any society. One example would be an asylum seeker being untruthful 
in an application for asylum to improve their chances to be granted asylum by a country or 
getting away with a fraudulent claim against a business. The world is becoming more globalised, 
and the requirement to communicate in one’s non-native tongue is becoming more common. 
Studies have shown that people tend to communicate truthfully (Levine, 2014; Serota & Levine, 
2014). However, a receiver should be cognisant that it could be profitable to the communicator 
to successfully deceive the receiver of a message or statement. 
The act of deceit is not a simple act. To be successful in deceptive communication 
requires awareness of, and the management of, several verbal and non-verbal indicators of 
deception whilst communicating with the intent to deceive. Much of the research done to date 
focused on non-verbal indicators such as facial expressions and physiological responses that 
includes heart rate and pupil dilation. The use of polygraphs to measure non-verbal indicators of 
deceit is well known and studied. Other popular methods reported to identify deceit include 
audio- and visual recordings of interviews and analysis afterwards, looking at the actions of the 
deceiver for indicators of deceptive communication (Kolkman, 2012).  Studies to determine the 
efficacy of some of these techniques have subsequently been discredited, reporting high 
occurrences of false-positives and false-negatives (Vrij, 2000). 
Past research has found that people are deceitful on a daily basis in their communication 
with their fellow humans. At a bare minimum it was found that people were deceptive at least 
twice a day (DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer, & Epsetin, 1996).  
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This study asked whether communicating in one’s second language does have a negative 
effect on one’s credibility, i.e. that second language communication, regardless of the veracity of 
the second language statement will preferentially be judged as untruthful. This study also 
investigated whether the converse holds true; that a statement provided in a first language 
resulted in a positive impact on one’s credibility, i.e. the first language communication will 
preferentially be judged as truthful. This study investigated whether the presence of cognitive 
load (an increase in the demand placed on one’s finite cognitive resources) whilst an individual 
was delivering a deceptive statement made it easier to detect the attempt to deceive. Finally, this 
study looked at whether Natural Language Processing Programmes (NLPs) out performed 
humans when it came to detecting deception, more specifically, if the software programme 
Linguistic Inquiry Word Count 2015 could achieve this differentiation.  
The approaches used to assess the areas of enquiry of this study were to ask participants 
to provide a number of statements, some that were aligned with their own view on a topic 
(truthful) and some that were not aligned with their view on a topic (untruthful, or deceptive).  
Some of the statements were required in their first language and some in a second language.  
Some participants provided statements under cognitive load, some with no cognitive load 
imposed. The effect of language fluency, as represented by first and second language use to 
provide or assess statements on the credibility of statements were quantified statistically.  
A study of this nature is particularly relevant in the South African context. South Africa 
is a country with eleven recognised official languages. But despite this and the fact that English 
is only spoken as a first language by 9.6% of the population, it remains the lingua franca 
(Statistics South Africa, 2012; Khokhlova, 2015). English is the language of government, 
medicine, commerce and the justice system. If indeed, communicating in one’s second language 
results in a preference for extending a lie bias to the communicator, then approximately 90% of 
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South Africa’s population’s credibility could potentially be negatively influenced when 
communicating in English as a non-native language. 
Research Problem 
Research reports that people do not fare well in detecting the presence of deception in 
statements. Several studies have found that on average detection of deceit accuracy rate is not 
different to a chance outcome (Bond, & DePaulo, 2006; DePaulo et al., 2003; Vrij; 2000; van 
Vuuren, 2017). As such, various techniques have been put forward to improve the accuracy rates 
of detecting deceptive communication. Contemporary research finds that communication through 
a non-native language are often assumed to be deceitful. Research found that this lie bias exists 
regardless of the ability of the receiver to detect deception (Evans, & Michael, 2014). The 
presence of this bias is problematic for those who for no fault of their own, have to speak in their 
non-native language. However, studies conducted by researchers such as Cheng and Broadhurst 
(2005), Da Silva and Leach (2013) and Lev-Ari and Keysar (2010) has found that that if a person 
speaks in their native tongue, then they are afforded a truth-bias.  
Significance of the study 
This study contributes to the growing field of deception detection as well as improves the 
understanding of the dynamic of interpersonal communication. An improved understanding of 
the presence of biases, if present, can form the basis of future research to propose 
countermeasures to be followed to prevent deceptive communication from occurring. The results 
obtained from this study could be useful to the judicial and the police operations as well as 
financial institutions 
If a proven means can be developed that increases the ability of human evaluators of 
statements to accurately detect deception, the aforementioned chance outcome typically 
associated with human evaluation can be improved. Studies have suggested that placing someone 
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under cognitive load whilst communicating makes it difficult for the communicator to deceive.  
If this assertion holds, this approach might provide an avenue to improve the accuracy of 
veracity assessment, in both human evaluators as well as computer-based language analysis 
programs.  
Although much of the existing research indicates that deception is highly prevalent, it is 
important to understand the potential impact that a second language bias may have on the 
perception of honesty as it may have disastrous effects on the livelihoods of those who have no 
choice but to speak and interact in their non-native tongue. Furthermore, this study is of 
importance because despite the plethora of studies that deal with deception and the detection 
thereof few studies have been conducted on the notion that certain biases exists and are extended 
to people under certain instances, and that these bias in turn may hinder the ability to correctly 
classify deception from honesty in both high-stakes and low-stakes situations. The insight gained 
from this study shows us that it is not as simple as a proposed by past literature that a lie bias is 
extended to second language speakers, but in actual fact, this bias is more nuanced. That this bias 
is only present when second language reviewers are reviewing a second language statements. 
Chapters Overview  
Chapter 2 Literature Review. This chapter highlights previous research done in the 
field of deception. It addresses the problem of defining deception. It addresses the known 
existing cues as well as physiological indicators of deception. The literature review speaks to the 
various cues which have been used in the past to detect deception, from looking briefly at the 
physiological cues to looking at the verbal cues used in more contemporary empirical studies. 
The literature review addresses language processing frameworks characterising linguistic 
profiles of deceptive communication through the use of algorithms such as LIWC (Linguistic 
Inquiry Word Count). The literature review addresses studies that looked at the interaction of 
second language communication and deception assessment.  
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Chapter 2 ends with a summary of the rationale and the specific areas of enquiry of this 
study, stating the research hypotheses. 
Chapter 3 Methodology. Chapter 3 addresses the methodology used in this empirical 
study. It describes the approach used for participant recruitment and data collection. The chapter 
elaborates on the procedure used to generate the statements and the controls deployed to ensure 
balanced representation across the key variables used for the analysis. The chapter touches on the 
statistical techniques used for analysis and concludes with the ethical considerations and 
approval received for the study.  
Chapter 4 Results. Chapter 4 presents the results of the analysis conducted. The chapter 
is organised according to the research questions. Descriptive and inferential statistics, including 
validation tests for methods used are presented in tables and figures. 
Chapter 5 Discussion. This chapter discusses the results derived from the analysis with 
reference to the extant literature discussed in chapter 2. The limitations identified in this study 
are listed. Recommendations for further areas of inquiry identified based on the results of this 
study concludes this chapter. 
AN INVESTIGATION OF  LIE BIAS AND COGNITIVE LOAD 
 
6 
Chapter 2 Literature Review 
This chapter presents a review of the existing literature in the field of deception. It offers 
a conceptual discussion of deception. It speaks to the cues (verbal and non-verbal) that are often 
used to detect deception. The chapter reviews several techniques used to detect deceit, paying 
specific attention to cognitive load and language techniques used to date. The chapter reviews 
studies focusing on the relationship between second language and deception, and the impact that 
language proficiency has on veracity assessments. This chapter positions this study within the 
reviewed literature and ends with the study’s main research questions and hypotheses. 
What constitutes deception?  
Like many constructs and concepts in psychology, the views on what constitutes 
deception exactly are polarised. There have been a number of attempts to define deception and 
what constitutes deceptive communication (Masip, Garrido, & Herrero, 2004).  
Mitchell (1986) argued that for a statement to be deceptive, it had to be a false statement 
from which the sender of that message accrued a benefit. Anolli and Ciceri (1997) argued that 
deception is characterised by two types of communicative intentions, the hidden intention (where 
the speaker intends to be deceptive, specifically by altering the content of the message) and the 
manifest intention (where the speaker intends to convincingly communicate with the receiver).  
 Vrij (2000) and Levine (2014) similarly argue that for a statement to be deceptive, the 
message has to be a specific and deliberate attempt by the sender to mislead the receiver of the 
message or, alternatively be conveyed with an intent to foster a sense of belief in the intended 
target. Masip and colleagues (2004) argue that for a message to be considered deceptive, two 
characteristics had to be present; (a) on the sender’s part there had to be an attempt to conceal the 
fact that the sender has the intention to deceive, (b) there had to be some attempt at fabrication 
and/or manipulation of information to facilitate and sustain the deceit. McCornack, Morrison, 
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Paik, Wisner and Zhou (2014) argued that something is deceptive when there is some form of 
selective control over which information is disseminated to the receiver.  
An earlier study concluded that a deceitful act presents in one of three forms, through the 
act of lying, the act of omission or through the act of equivocation (Buller, & Burgoon, 1996). 
Deceit via lying occurs when the message sent consists of a deliberate falsification of 
information with the intent to mislead the receiver. Deceit via omission means there was a 
conscious effort on the sender’s part to withhold pertinent information and deceit via 
equivocation occurs when ambiguous language is used to mislead the intended receiver (Buller, 
& Burgoon, 1996).  
The theme that thus emerges in literature is that a deceptive message requires an intention 
from the sender to deceive the receiver; the sender needs to know, or believe, that the content of 
the message is false and that sustaining deceptive communication requires ongoing efforts to 
conceal, fabricate or manipulate information (Mitchell, 1986; Buller, & Burgoon, 1996; Levine, 
2014; Massip et al., 2004; McCornack et al., 2014;; Vrij, 2000).  
For the purpose of this thesis, the definitions offered by Vrij (2000) and Levine (2014) 
are adopted - deception occurs when a deliberate attempt is made to manipulate the information 
provided to the recipient of the message with the intent to mislead the recipient.  
The lenses through which deception can be viewed.  
Multiple theories have been put forward to explain deception and provide reasons why 
human evaluators generally are not good at judging veracity. Two theories, pertinent to the 
empirical study of this thesis are briefly discussed. The first is Interpersonal Deception Theory 
(IDT) focussing on the act of deception within the processes of communication and the second is 
Truth-Default Theory (TDT) as it offers a framework in which to assess the possible presence of 
a truth-bias toward veracity assessment as described in deception literature.  
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Interpersonal Deception Theory. The IDT framework states deceptive communication 
is a complicated process with several steps required to deliver and maintain deceptive 
communication. Deceptive communication occurs between participants who each have their own 
motives and aims that are not aligned (Burgoon, & Buller, 2014). As deception is an active and 
purposeful act, both sender and receiver actively engage in the process. Both the sender and 
receiver of a deceptive message need to engage simultaneously in encoding and decoding of the 
message (Burgoon & Buller, 2014).  
IDT holds that honest statements differ from deceptive statements, and that these 
differences can be observed (Burgoon & Buller, 2014). This assertion emanates from the fact 
that the speaker of the message is engaging in both strategic behaviour (intended behaviour) and 
non-strategic behaviours (unintended behaviours) concurrently. According to Bond, Levine and 
Hartwig (2014) IDT argues that people engage in both strategic and non-strategic behaviours 
whilst encoding and decoding messages. Buller and Burgoon (2008) argue that the strategic 
behaviours occur naturally when it comes to communication and are present since an early age. 
An example of this early strategic or intended behaviour is the use of gestures when describing 
how big something is. Non-strategic behaviours, in turn, are beyond conscious control, 
unintentional and result in behavioural leakage, which may indicate the presence of deception. 
IDT sees communication has being an interactive and dynamic event between two parties, a 
sender and receiver, this manipulation of information, places additional cognitive load on both 
parties (Buller & Burgoon, 1996). 
Burgoon, Blair and Strom (2008) argue that a person’s veracity assessment of something 
is influenced by four cognitive biases. The first cognitive bias is the visual bias. The visual bias 
argues that people rely too heavily on the non-verbal behaviours accompanying the speech of 
others rather than listening and looking at the language employed by the individuals (Burgoon et 
al., 2008). The second bias is the demeanour bias. The demeanour bias occurs when receivers 
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place emphasis on the communication style to make veracity judgements; it is based on the 
sender’s personal character competency (Burgoon et al., 2008). The third bias is described as the 
expectancy violation bias (van Vuuren, 2017). This bias is concerned with social or cultural 
norms and is the result of receivers judging a statement as deceptive if it should violate social 
and cultural norms (Burgoon et al., 2008). The fourth and final cognitive bias which Burgoon et 
al., (2008) identified is known as truth bias. This is the predisposition of people to see people and 
their statements as truthful rather than deceptive i.e. receivers tend to judge senders as being 
innately truthful (Burgoon et al., 2008). Truth bias corresponds with IDT’s idea that people 
expect others to be honest.  
When people enter a conversation, IDT proponents argue that they do so under the 
influence of the truth bias. Burgoon and Buller (2014) argue the reason for successful deception 
is that receivers do not recognise leakage and behavioural cues. The communication process is a 
complex process that makes use of heuristics and as such, people only concentrate on 
information selectively and in such a manner as to confirm their assumptions and expectations 
(Buller & Burgoon, 1996). 
Levine, Park and McCornack (1999) found when someone makes a veracity judgement 
of a message, the original veracity of the message is a crucial factor. Levine and colleagues 
(1999) argued that judgement accuracy would increase if a receiver saw or heard a greater 
number of truthful statements. This was coined the veracity effect by Levine and colleagues 
(1999). In essence the veracity effect is based on the idea that the original veracity of a message 
will exert an influence on the veracity assessment of a statement. 
Truth-Default Theory. In 2014 a new theory pertaining to the detection of deception, 
and a new way of understanding why people get away with deception during communication 
arose. This theory was dubbed Truth-Default Theory (TDT) (Levine, 2014). The fundamental 
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premise of TDT is that people are more likely to believe others are honest, i.e. they have a truth 
bias.  TDT argues that this bias is highly adaptive as this truth default state, allows for efficient 
communication and co-operation. However, these proponents do warn that although most of the 
time communication is honest, this presumption of honesty does make people vulnerable to 
being deceived (Levine, 2014). The adaptive nature of this default state was already previously 
suggested by Zukerman, DePaulo, and Rosenthal (1981).  
Truth-default theory, as it pertains to this study, has two central constructs with several 
propositions to the constructs. These are the Truth-Default Theory constructs of the truth-default 
state and the closely related truth-bias. According to TDT, the truth-default state arises out of a 
passive assumption of honesty.  This state follows from either failing to acknowledge the 
possibility of deception or relying on a cognitive state in which there is not enough information 
to confirm deception (Levine, 2014).  Levine (2014) further argues, by default, this presumption 
occurs without conscious reflection and that it is a starting place to make inferences regarding 
communication. 
Levine (2014) states that the possibility of deception does not present itself unless there is 
a reason to suspect the presence of deceit, and this notion of is founded on the Spinozan model of 
belief (Gilbert, 1991). In other words, all incoming information, unless actively disproved, are 
preferentially assessed as truths. 
The truth bias can be understood as the tendency of receivers to assume that people are 
inherently honest at all times, and as such receiver’s judge or expect that communication will be 
honest and truthful, regardless of the actual honesty conveyed in the communication. Central to 
understanding this bias, are the perceived truth-lie base rates (van Vuuren, 2017).  The concept 
of a truth-lie base rate presumes that the expectations from receivers of messages influences the 
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outcome of the veracity assessment. Street and Richardson (2015) tested this idea and found that 
when judges expected a message to be true, the message was preferentially judged as truthful  
The betrayers of deception 
 As early as 1969 Ekman and Friesen argued that deception, when present, could be 
detected by observation of certain non-verbal cues. Despite this finding, people in general do not 
fare much better than chance when it comes to correctly determining the presence of deception.  
The accuracy of correct veracity assessments by people is similar to a chance outcome (DePaulo 
et al., 2003). When looking at these cues of deceit, empirical research divides these cues into 
verbal cues and non-verbal cues. Verbal cues include tonality, vocalic pitch and the types of 
words used, etc. (Zuckerman, & Driver, 2014). Non-verbal cues are associated with the body’s 
response such as galvanic skin conductance or individual responses such gaze avoidance, etc. 
Empirical research argues that these cues betray the presence of deception by ‘leaking’ through 
both the verbal and non-verbal channels (DePaulo, 1994; Ekman, & Friesen, 1969; Ekman, & 
Friesen, 1974; Ströfer, Noordzij, Ufkes & Giebels, 2015; Strömwall, Granhag, & Hartwig, 2004; 
Zuckerman, & Driver, 2014).  
Body leakage as a cue to deception. Fundamental to this concept of using observation 
of leakage as an indicator to detect acts of deception, is the premise that despite conscious effort 
to control this leakage, we are not able to control our non-verbal behaviour with a large measure 
of success. It follows that the non-verbal behaviour which is leaked could therefore indicate 
whether the message conveyed is true or deceptive in nature (Zuckerman, & Driver, 2014). 
Zuckerman and Driver (2014) found that certain channels were more controllable than others 
were and that our ability therefore to successfully control leakage in the different channels 
presents on a continuum of control possibilities. Body language and tone of voice fall on the less 
controllable side of the spectrum, whereas verbal and facial expressions fall on the more 
controllable side of the continuum (Zuckerman, & Driver, 2014). This idea of body leakage 
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assumes that the channels that are less under our control are the ones that will betray the 
presence of deception in the message conveyed.  
Evidence to support the idea the idea that deception cues are leaked via bodily channels 
can be found in some of Ekman and Friesen’s earlier work. In 1974, Ekman and Friesen 
proposed that the source of the leakage of cues associated with deception stemmed more from 
the body than the face. The authors argued that this was the case for those who grew up in a 
Westernised society because in a Westernised society people are taught from an early age to 
control their facial expressions (Ekman & Friesen, 1974). When investigating body leakage, 
Ekman and Friesen (1974) developed two hypotheses. The first of these was that participants 
preferentially focused on facial expression cues to identify deception.  It follows then that to 
conceal cues associated with deception, senders have to put the most effort towards controlling 
facial expression (Ekman & Friesen, 1974). The second hypothesis was that when making 
judgements concerning the veracity of statements, participants would attain a higher accuracy 
rates if they based veracity judgements on body rather than the face (Ekman & Friesen, 1974). 
Ekman and Friesen (1974) asked participants to be honest in one interview after viewing a 
pleasant film, by describing their true feelings and deceptive in a secondary interview after 
viewing an unpleasant film. The study fully supported hypothesis one, as participants stated that 
the face had to be controlled more than the body when being deceptive and hypothesis two was 
only partially supported (Ekman & Friesen, 1974). In 1994 DePaulo investigated how would 
could improve the accuracy of deception detection. In contrast to what Ekman and Friesen 
(1974) argued, she found that deception accuracy was greater if one looked at the bodily cues, 
such as fidgeting, pupil dilation and so forth, then looking at the face for cues associated with 
deception.  
Studies have argued that there are behavioural cues associated with attempts to mask 
deception in the presences of active attempts by the deceiver to control non-verbal behaviour. 
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Because of this increase in attempted control, the deceiver appears too rehearsed and lacks 
spontaneity in body movements (DePaulo, 1994), and those movements that do occur come across 
as exaggerated (Zuckerman, & Driver, 2014). 
Emotional leakage as a cue to deception.  Closely linked to the notion of the body 
betraying deception by leaking cues of deceit, is the idea that emotions can also betray the fact 
that deceit is present. In other words, certain emotions, such as fear of being caught or the feeling 
of guilt for lying in the first place, are incongruent with the lie being told, and are thus leaked 
through various non-verbal channels (Ekman & Friesen, 1969; Ekman, 2001).  
Porter and ten Brinke (2008) sought to determine if emotional leakage occurred when 
being deceptive. To investigate this the researchers asked participants to view several images 
designed to bring out different emotional responses, such as happiness, sadness, disgust, anger, 
irritability etc. In this experiment, the senders were asked to deceive via an emotional expression 
(i.e. they were asked to express an emotion that they were not feeling) (Porter & ten Brinke, 
2008). In the study three types of responses existed in the deceptive condition; (a) a stimulating 
condition; in which they were asked to fake experiencing an emotion which was not being felt, 
(b) a neutralising condition, in which they had to display no emotion, and (c) a masking 
condition, in which they had to fake an emotion contradictory to what they were feeling (Porter 
& ten Brinke, 2008). Porter and ten Brinke (2008) concluded that emotional leakage did 
accompany the act of deceit, as emotional leakage was present in each of their study’s 
experimental conditions. Additionally, the result of the study indicated that emotional leakage 
was more prevalent in the masking condition (Porter & ten Brinke, 2008).  
Porter, ten Brinke and Wallace (2012) investigated the impact of emotional intensity on 
deception and if it would result in emotional leakage occurring. Participants viewed various 
images of varying degrees of emotional intensity (e.g. disgusting, sad, joyous etc.) and then had 
AN INVESTIGATION OF  LIE BIAS AND COGNITIVE LOAD 
 
14 
to respond to the images. Five second videos were taken of their facial expressions and frames, 
spaced each 1/30s analysed. Results supported Darwin’s claim that certain facial expressions 
linked to emotion could not be inhibited (Porter et al., 2012). This study also found high intensity 
deceptive emotions (emotional states in which it was expected to be greater inconsistencies 
between what was felt and the resulting facial expressions) were linked to more emotional 
leakage (Porter et al., 2012) 
ten Brinke, Porter and Baker (2012) posited that deception was inherently a part of the 
communication process, and that it was always accompanied by unfelt emotions or the 
suppression of emotions which corresponded to the nature of the message. Based on this idea the 
researchers investigated the consequences of high-stake lies by looking at specific facial muscles 
(ten Brinke et al., 2012). Participants were exposed to real-life recordings of family members 
requesting the safe return of missing family members (half of which was deceptive as the person 
who was pleading was later convicted for murder) (ten Brinke et al., 2012). The facial muscles of 
the participants were coded frame-by-frame. Findings of the study supported the idea that whilst 
being deceptive emotional leakage did occur, and found that this emotional leakage stemmed 
from facial muscles. The study found that masking smiles and failed attempts to appear 
remorseful was more prevalent in deceptive pleas (ten Brinke et al., 2012). 
Verbal indicators of deceit . Due to the two meta-analyses conducted by DePaulo et al 
(2003) and Bond and DePaulo (2006) which show the using non-verbal cues to detect deception 
does not improve accuracy, there has been a shift in empirical enquiry to start focusing more on 
the verbal cues associated with deception (Vrij, 2018). As with any cue of deception it is thought 
the verbal cues ‘leak’ out through the language used by the deceiver.  In deception literature, 
before this shift to looking at verbal cues as potential indicators of deception it was often thought 
that detection accuracy would be higher if one focused solely on the non-verbal cues of 
deception, because it is easier to control physical behaviour than our voices (Vrij, 2008). There 
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are four main cornerstones to the idea that non-verbal indicators are better at indicating deceit. 
Firstly, there is unlike with behaviour, there is no automatic link between an experienced 
emotion and the types of words used (Vrij, Taylor, & Picornell, 2015b). Secondly, people are 
generally better at using words than using behaviour to get what they want (Vrij et al., 2015b). 
Thirdly, people are more conscious about what they are saying than their non-verbal behaviour 
(Vrij et al., 2015b). Finally, people can stop and plan the types of words they are going to use 
before they speak, but this is not the case with their non-verbal behaviour (Vrij et al., 2015b).  
But despite this increased attention to looking at the verbal indicators of deception, no 
one universal set of diagnostic verbal cues has arose (Vrij et al., 2015b). A potential explanation 
for this is because deceiver’s or liars do not always tell a lie in the same manner nor fashion 
(Picornell, 2013). When looking at the deceiver’s language, the following four cues are typically 
investigated word quantity, usage of pronouns, cognitive complexity and emotional word usage 
(Picornell, 2013). This thesis will elaborate on these later in thesis chapter.  
It should be noted that efficacy of verbal cues associated with deception are strongly 
influenced by the properties of and the nature of the experiment being conducted. Factors which 
exert and influence on the findings of these studies include the nature of the stimuli i.e. is it a 
video tape, or a written statement, or a web-based decision task (Bond, & Lee, 2005; Zhou, 
Burgoon, Nunamaker, Jr, & Twitchell, 2004), the nature of the topic at hand i.e. is it a topic 
which is highly emotionally strung or is it a more mundane topic (Hancock, Curry, Goorha, & 
Woodworth, 2008), how incentivised the deceiver to get away with the lie (Sporer, 1997) and the 
very nature of the experimental subjects i.e. are the convicted criminals or offenders versus 
university students (Kassin, Meissner, & Norwick, 2005; Porter, & ten Brinke, 2008). It has also 
been found that the nature of the medium influences how effective these cues will be i.e. is the 
communication being done in a face-to-face situation or is it taking place in the form of a 
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computer medium, the latter allowing for greater preparation and planning (Burgoon, Blair, Qin, 
Nunamaker. Jr., 2003; Woodworth, Hancock, & Goorha, 2005).  
Despite all these so-called non-verbal and verbal cues of deceit having been identified, 
the one finding which has been consistent in deception literature, is that people are poor at 
correctly determining veracity as was found by DePaulo and colleagues (2003) in the meta-
analysis.  Empirical studies have offered some explanations to account for this low accuracy 
rating when it comes to detecting deceit. For the most part, people who are trying to discern truth 
from lie make use of cues that are poorly correlated with deception (Anderson, DePaulo, 
Ansfield, Tickle, & Green, 1999). In 1996 Vrij, Semin and Bull offered an explanation for this 
low accuracy rating. According to the authors, there is a difference between what they refer to as 
objective cues and the perception of these cues.  
According to Vrij and colleagues (1996) actual objective cues are founded on empirically 
proven non-verbal indicators of deception, whereas perceived indicators are those cues which 
reviewers associate with deceit regardless of whether these cues are associated with deceit. 
Additionally, these poor detection rates have been attributed to common misconceptions of what 
an actual cue to deceit is (Carlucci, Compo, & Zimmerman, 2013). Vrij (2008) suggests the 
reviewers often seek out the cues which they assume are indicative of honesty or deceit. A more 
contemporary reason for this poor detection rating is offered by Vrij, Granhag, and Porter 
(2010). The researchers postulated that this low rating could be attributed to what they called the 
‘Othello Effect’. Simply put, this effect occurs when nervousness which is present during an 
interview setting is attributed to be an indication of honesty or deceit (Vrij et al., 2010). Finally, 
this poor detection rating can be explained by the fact that for the most part deception studies 
have low ecological validity as they are seldom occurring in high-stakes situation, and as such 
there is little reason for the deceiver to get away with the deceit (Frank, Freeley, Paolotonio, & 
Servoss, 2004; Carlucci, Compo, & Zimmerman, 2013).  
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Despite this poor performance at detecting deception, researchers and studies continued 
to try to find individuals who excel at detecting deception. In 2004, O’Sullivan and Ekman 
conducted a study that sought to discover outstanding lie detectors. Out of 12,000 tested only 29 
were identified as exceptional lie detectors and were aptly named ‘Wizards’ (O’Sullivan & 
Ekman, 2004). Bond and DePaulo (2008) counter argued that if one considers statistical 
techniques and arguments, these so called ‘wizards’ may just have occurred due to chance. 
The evolution of deception detection techniques 
Within the deception literature it is apparent that through the years various techniques 
have been tried and researched in order to find the optimal technique to correctly detect the 
presence of deceit (Ben-Shakhar, Bar-Hillel & Kremnitzer, 2002). Techniques have gone from a 
reliance on arousal-based techniques such as the polygraph to using various interview styles to 
detect the presence of deceit. Other techniques which have garnered increased empirical focus 
include inducing a higher level of cognitive load on the deceiver (Blandón-Gitlin, Fenn, Masip & 
Yoo, 2014; Christ, van Essen, Watson, Brubaker, McDermot, 2009; DePaulo et al., 2003; 
Patterson, 2009; Vrij & Ganis, 2014; Vrij, Fisher & Blank, 2015a; Zuckerman, DePaulo, 
Rosenthal, 1981), to focusing entirely on the language used by the deceiver (Akehurst, Köhnken, 
& Höffer, 2001; Johnson, & Raye, 1989; Oberlader et al., 2016; Parker, & Brown, 2000; Steller, 
& Köhnken, 1989; Strömwall, Bengtsson, Leander & Granhag, 2004; Vrij, Akehurst, Soukara, & 
Bull, 2002).  
Deception detection through arousal. In the forensic field, the polygraph is often used 
as a diagnostic procedure to establish credibility (Palmatier, & Rovner, 2015). Polygraph testing 
has come under scrutiny with a number of empirical studies and much debate as to the accuracy 
of the assessments flowing from the interpretation of polygraph results (Palmatier, & Rovnar, 
2015). The polygraph measures the psychophysiological response of the body when the 
individual is being interviewed (Ben-Shakhar et al., 2002; Raskin, & Honts, 2002). The 
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polygraph is based on the well-researched and well-documented flight-or-fight response (Raskin, 
& Honts, 2002). The flight-or-fight response refers to the body’s complex response to a 
physiological or psychological threat, in which several complex reactions happen in the body 
that is readily measured by the polygraph. These responses include increases in blood pressure, 
decreases in respiratory response and constriction of blood vessels (Raskin, & Honts, 2002). The 
polygraph typically makes use of two distinct types of tests; the Control-Question Technique 
(CQT) and the Guilty knowledge Test (GKT) (Ben-Shakhar et al. 2002; Ben-Shakhar, 2002). 
With both types of testing, guilt is established by an increase in physiological response of the 
suspect (Ben-Shakhar, 2002; Icanon & Lykken, 1997). 
 One of the problems with polygraph testing and the use of its findings in criminal 
procedures is the ongoing debate with regards to the validity and reliability of polygraph’s 
results. Both of the two approaches to polygraph testing (CQT, GKT), can fall victim to 
countermeasures being used by the examinee (Ben-Shakhar, 2002; Ben-Shakhar & Dolev, 1996; 
Ben-Shakhar & Elaad, 2002). All countermeasures deployed intend to mislead the examiner in 
the analysis of the polygraph results. Countermeasures work by producing physiological 
responses which results in the examiner interpreting the messages as truthful (Vrij, 2000). 
Countermeasures can take the form of either a mental or physical countermeasure. Physical 
countermeasures are actions which are undertaken during the control question phase to influence 
the baseline physiological responses are used. Examples include, biting one’s tongue or pressing 
one’s toes against the floor (Vrij, 2000). Mental countermeasures that have been reported include 
counting back sequentially or counting sheep (Vrij, 2000). 
Interviewing to detect the presence of deceit. Empirical research has yet to prove the 
efficacy of arousal-based protocols such as polygraph interrogation, to detect the presence of 
deception (Mann, Vrij, & Bull, 2002; Vrij, 2000; Walczyk, Igou, Dixon & Tcholakian, 2013). As 
such, a considerable amount of the deception literature has looked at various interviewing 
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techniques to detect the presence of deceit. Two of these techniques will be discussed in this 
literature review, the Strategic Use of Evidence and the Devil’s Advocate Approach.  
Strategic Use of Evidence.  One of the most researched interviewing styles tested 
empirically is referred to as Strategic Use of Evidence (hereafter SUE). SUE is founded on the 
psychology of self-regulation, the tendency of people to control their behaviour to avoid 
undesirable situations (Forgas, Baumeister & Tice, 2009). And this self-regulation is mostly 
unconscious and happens automatically (Bargh, & Chartrand, 1999).  
SUE holds regardless of the veracity of statement, the sender will attempt to come across 
as innocent and deploy counter-interrogation strategies, be these verbal or non-verbal behaviour 
(Granhag, & Hartwig, 2008; Hartwig, Granhag, & Luke, 2014). SUE assumes that that the 
interviewer possesses incriminating evidence that can be used to counter the testimony of the 
examinee (Wagenaar, van Koppen & Crombag, 1993). The SUE technique comprises of various 
techniques which are concerned with how best to use the available evidence (Luke et al., 2012). 
Past research has provided empirical evidence to the support the SUE technique of withholding 
evidence.  In order to elicit statements which are not supported by corroborating evidence, the 
SUE interviewer will only ask questions related to the evidence (Luke et al., 2012). By not 
leading with questions based on evidence before the suspect has provided a statement, the 
chances of a guilty suspect avoiding contrary evidence is reduced (Hartwig, Granhag, Strömwall, 
& Vrij, 2005; Hartwig, Granhag, Strömwall, & Kronkvist 2006). Hartwig et al., (2006) 
determined that those trained in the SUE technique were 85.4% accurate, compared to those who 
were not, who scored and accuracy rating of 56.4%. 
The Devil’s Advocate Approach.  Leal, Vrij, Mann and Fisher (2010) developed a novel 
interview approach for discerning truth from lie. They named this new approach the Devil’s 
Advocate Approach. Within an interview setting which is utilising this technique two different 
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questions are asked. The interviewer asks the interviewee both an opinion eliciting question, in 
which the interviewee will reveal their opinion on said question. This is then immediately 
followed by the Devil’s Advocate question. This question expects the interviewees to generate 
and provide an opinion which is in contrast to their truly held beliefs or opinion. Hence this 
paradigm is formed on the idea that truths for liars will come to the bare during the Devil’s 
Advocate question, and the converse holds for truth-tellers (Deeb et al., 2017). 
The devil’s advocate approach is founded on both confirmation bias and the principle of 
impression bias. According to Ajzen (2001) one’s attitudes towards things and information are 
maintained via confirmation bias.  It is a well-documented phenomenon that views or 
information which aren’t aligned with one’s personal views are focused on above information 
which is in direct contradiction to one’s views or beliefs (Edwards, & Smith, 1996; Mercier, & 
Sperber, 2011). By selectively focusing on certain information, individual’s reactions reduce the 
cognitive dissonance, as they are eliminating the discomfort of having to confront contradictory 
evidence (Petty, Wegener, & Fabrigar, 1997). By doing this the individual maintains their 
viewpoint and enhances their access to points which would substantiate their argument (Deeb et 
al., 2017). Thus, when people are generating arguments for their truly held views (i.e. telling the 
truth) they would find it easier to find corroborating evidence. (Nickerson, 1998). The opposite is 
true for liars. 
The Verifiability Approach. A recent interviewing technique aimed at detecting deceit 
that is gaining attention is the Verifiability Approach. This interview technique exploits the 
differences between a truth and a lie by requiring from the speaker to provide as many verifiable 
details as possible during the interview (Nahari, 2019).  This approach defines verifiable detail as 
any detail that can be objectively verified (Nahari, Vrij, Fisher 2014a). This approach exploits 
what is described as the liar’s dilemma. When a person lies, they inadvertently enter the liar’s 
dilemma; having to provide enough detail to convince the receiving party of their story, whilst 
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not providing too much detail that could potentially be verified to be untrue.  The more detail 
provided, the greater the chance that the investigator might come across a detail which cannot be 
verified and would betray the deceit (Nahari, 2018). The liar’s dilemma arises as deceivers are 
trying to convince the interviewer of their honesty by providing detail but needing to balance this 
requirement with likelihood of the receiver being able to verify it as untrue. (Nahari, 2019).  
The Verifiability Approach interview technique begins with the interviewer instructing 
the interviewee to provide as much verifiable information as possible when recounting their story 
or providing a statement. This triggers the liar’s dilemma if the interviewee intends to lie 
(Nahari, 2019). This approach is showing promise, as studies have yielded accuracy rates of 70% 
in discerning truth from lies. (Harvey, Vrij, Nahari, & Ludwig, 2016; Jupe, Leal, Vrij, & Nahari, 
2017; Nahari et al, 2014b).  The verifiability approach also seems to be resistant to the 
countermeasures typically undertaken by liars to facilitate them getting away with deceit, as 
evidenced by studies in which the liars where informed of the manner in which they were going 
to be interviewed (Harvey et al., 2016; Jupe et al., 2017). 
The (cognitive) cost of being deceitful . In addition to the increased focus on the verbal 
indicators of deception, another major turning point when it came to detecting deception was the 
move from arousal-based techniques to focusing on the various cognitive processes or strategies 
employed by liars, and how-to best counter them (Vrij, 2018). According to Vrij (2018) this shift 
resulted from a report published in 2003 by National Research Council in the US. In this report 
the NRC concluded that no theory existed that could attribute an adequate reason as to the reason 
why deceivers would show a greater level of arousal (i.e. why they would be more nervous) than 
truth-tellers (Vrij, 2018). Secondly this report concluded that at the time it was not possible to 
ask a specific that would increase the level of nervousness of the liar (Vrij, 2008). Techniques 
built around cognition techniques are considered with the latter finding of NRC report. New 
AN INVESTIGATION OF  LIE BIAS AND COGNITIVE LOAD 
 
22 
interview protocols were being develop in order to facilitate these differing cognitive processes 
between truth-tellers and deceivers, and in turn, enhance the verbal indicators of deception.  
Although numerous physiological responses have been observed during a state of 
increased arousal, most researchers assert that this is more likely emanating from the fear of 
being caught out as being deceptive and that one must therefore consider the context in which the 
interrogation is done. Is the person fearful of being falsely found guilty or is the subject feeling 
guilty for no obvious reason or nervous? Each of these states will result in a physiological 
reaction (Patterson, 2009). Where the polygraph relies on physiological measures to detect 
deception, cognitive load approaches argue that being deceptive requires greater mental effort 
making it hard to get away with the deception (Walczyk et al., 2013). 
The idea to use additional cognitive load to aid in detecting deception can be traced back 
to the observations made of Zuckerman, DePaulo and Rosenthal (1981), who argued that lying 
was more taxing on cognition than telling the truth. Because of this observation, many empirical 
studies have been and are still being conducted into the efficacy of cognitive-load approaches to 
detecting deception (Blandón-Gitlin et al., 2014). It is argued that the amount of cognitive load 
experienced by an individual whilst providing statements can be increased through the use of 
certain techniques or through specific interventions (Vrij et al., 2015a). The idea underpinning 
the use of cognitive load during the statement-gathering phase is that lying is more cognitively 
taxing, and that by increasing the cognitive load on the liar whilst providing a statement or 
during an interview makes it more challenging for the liar to mask the attempts at deception. The 
premise is that by increasing the cognitive load experienced by the deceiver, the total amount of 
cognitive load would be too much to control adequately. This in turn, would result in the 
interrogator having a better chance to detect deception. The interrogatee would betray that 
deception was present, by displaying more behavioural cues associated with deception because 
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of the reduced capacity to control behavioural cues following from the increased task complexity 
(Vrij et al, 2015a. Vrij, Fisher, Mann, & Leal, 2006).  
Empirical research, with evidence stemming from real-life police settings, has found that 
the increase in cognitive load may result in physical manifestations. These manifestations 
include increased amount of blinking, increased fidgeting among others (Vrij et al., 2006). 
Because of these findings, the authors argue that if an interview style which utilises cognitive 
load were to be employed it would make it easier to detect deceit, as cognitive load will 
introduce a secondary task which would be more taxing cognitively, that sustaining the lie or 
deceit would be made more difficult. Several reasons have been offered as to why the increase in 
cognitive load facilitates the detection of deception. Without prior preparation of the lie or the 
fabricated story, deriving a feasible and/or a believable story requires a greater amount of 
cognitive effort (Vrij, Mann, Fisher, Leal, Milner, & Bull, 2008). Liars need to continually assess 
if their lies are being believed and if they are plausible claims or stories, and as such they must 
exert a greater amount of effort to ensure that no slip-of-the-tongue phenomena occur, which 
would betray the fact that they are lying (Vrij et al., 2008). Thirdly, liars do not enter a 
conversation under the assumption that they will appear credible and honest as truth-tellers do, as 
a result they are continuously monitoring their own demeanour and that of the receiver, to ensure 
that they are getting away with the deception, and this is draining on the amount of cognitive 
resources that they have (Vrij et al., 2008).  
According to Blandón-Gitlin et al., (2014) at a neuro-cognitive level, on the sender’s part, 
lying activates event-related memory, and this information is detrimental to the deceiver. The 
activation of the event-related memory causes problems for the deceiver as it is now required to 
manage the unwanted information in such a manner as to control any leakage which would 
undermine the credibility of the speaker (Blandón-Gitlin et al., 2014). Conversely, in the case of 
the truth-teller, the spreading of the activation of memory networks allows useful information to 
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become available (Blandón-Gitlin et al., 2014). Neuro-imaging studies further show there is 
significantly greater activation of certain brain regions when deception occurs. More specifically, 
the regions involved with working memory appear more active when a person is lying as 
opposed to being truthful (Christ et al., 2009). Blandón-Gitlin et al., (2014) established that on 
the behavioural-cognitive level, cognitive load approaches influenced the use of both cognitive 
and behavioural strategies to appear credible (Blandón-Gitlin et al., 2014). This idea is supported 
empirically by recalling events in reverse order. This is because an imagined event is challenging 
to manipulate during backward recall (Blandón-Gitlin et al., 2014). 
Several studies have been conducted to test the idea that being deceptive increases 
cognitive load and attempted to determine the underlying mechanisms that contribute to this 
increased cognitive load. DePaulo et al., (2003) suggest that those who are being deceptive do 
not take their credibility for granted; therefore, they engage in impression management. Patterson 
(2009) argued that lying imposes an additional demand on one’s finite cognitive resources 
available to the deceiver. Another mechanism identified is that liars are constantly monitoring 
their audience to ensure that they are ‘getting away’ with their lie, and therefore there is less 
available cognitive resources to suppress the truth (DePaulo et al., 2003). Furthermore, Patterson 
(2009) argued that this increase in cognitive load arose due to the nature of being deceptive. 
Patterson (2009) believed that as lying by nature is an intentional act, rather than a spontaneous 
one, it demands more cognitive resources. 
Several studies have suggested various techniques which can be deployed to impose 
additional cognitive load. Techniques include asking interviewees to narrate a story in reverse 
chronological order, instructing participants to always maintain eye contact and finally have 
participants perform several tasks concurrently (Evans, Meissner, Michael, & Brandon, 2013; 
Vrij et al., 2008; Vrij, Leal, Mann, & Fisher, 2012; Zimmerman, Veinott, Meissner, Fallon, & 
Mueller, 2010). 
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In various studies participants reported that they experienced an increase in cognitive 
load when telling a lie. Participants felt that it was cognitively more taxing to lie than telling the 
truth (Hartwig et al, 2006; Vrij, & Mann, 2006).  In 2007 Vrij, Mann, Kirsten and Fisher sought 
to determine if an increase in task complexity would result in an increase in the cognitive load 
reported by participants. They found that the greater the task complexity, the greater the amount 
of cognitive load reported by the participants. 
In 2005, Walczyk et al., proposed and created an innovative approach to induce cognitive 
load called Time Restricted Integrity-Confirmation (Tri-Con). Tri-Con is founded on the 
differences in mental states between those who tell the truth and those who deceive (Walczyk et 
al., 2005). Tri-Con enhances cognitive load by asking unanticipated questions and requires quick 
response. Tri-Con works according to specific guidelines. Firstly, examinees are primed about 
area of enquiry of the upcoming questions. Secondly, despite this priming the specific questions 
are not disclosed until the examination. Thirdly, questions are deliberately kept vague and 
ambiguous to make it difficult to prepare lies. Fourthly, examinees are expected to respond 
immediately (Walczyk et al., 2005). The high cognitive load induced by the rapid questioning 
and responding increase the likelihood of cues leaking such as changes in pitch, pace and an 
increase in pupil dilation (Buller, & Burgoon, 1996; Walczyk et al., 2005; Walczyk et al., 2013). 
Tri-Con has been tested empirically and the results are reported to be promising. 
Tri-Con’s efficacy has been tested and established in empirical work. In 2003, Walczyk, 
Roper, Seemann and Humphrey asked adults to tell a lie and a truth their lives. By making use of 
responses time as the indicator of the presence of deceit, Tri-Con was successfully able to 
distinguish between truth and lie. In 2009, Walczyk, Mahoney, Doverspike and Griffith-Ross 
tested Tri-Con again, in which a rehearsal condition was added. Thus, participants allowed to 
prepare lies and truths. Liars and truth-tellers were classified 89% accurately. In 2012 Walczyk 
and colleagues tested Tri-Con again, this time in a forensic context. After watching a mock 
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crime, witnesses were required to report what they witnessed truthfully or witnesses were 
instructed construct a false witness report (Walczyk et al., 2012). Cognitive cues were used, 
these included response time, answer consistency, eye movements etc. Tri-Con correctly 
classified the lies and truths 69% of the time (Walcayk et al., 2012). Although, Tri-Con shows 
promise, it is not without its criticisms and limitations. One such criticism is offered by Sporer 
and Schwant (2007) who argue that the extended narratives provided by suspects allow for 
valuable verbal indicators of deceit to be used, and Walczyk et al., (2013) acknowledge that Tri-
Con does not afford its examinees a chance to qualify their answers. 
Uncovering the truth through language. Ekman (1992) claimed that liars tend to focus 
and be careful about the words they use since words are one of the most differentiated ways in 
which we communicate and are often scrutinised. A recent study found that language had some 
diagnostic value when used to differentiate between truth-tellers and liars (Jupe, Vrij, Leal, & 
Nahari, 2018). In a typical paradigm for studying language and deception, particularly in terms 
of communication, two groups of communicators are randomly assigned to two distinct groups 
where one group is instructed to be truthful and the other is instructed to be deceptive (Sporer & 
Schwandt, 2006). When it comes to detecting deception using language constructs several 
techniques and frameworks have been proposed. The most commonly used frameworks are that 
of Statement Validity Analysis (SVA) and Reality Monitoring (RM) (Vrij, Akehurst, Soukara, & 
Bull, 2002).  
Statement Validity Assessment.  Criteria-Based Content Analysis (hereafter CBCA) 
forms the basis of this language technique to determine veracity. SVA was originally 
conceptualised and designed to assess and determine the veracity of childhood sexual assault 
case statements. The Undeutsch hypothesis forms the basis of CBCA, which posits that 
statements based on actual experience are richer in detail when compared to those statements that 
are made on non-experienced based statements. This is because they can be readily be called 
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upon, rather than made up. CBCA comprises of a set of five categories (19 criteria) which are 
theorised to be more frequent in truthful as compared to deceptive statements (Vrij et al., 2015b).  
These five categories are general characteristics, specific characteristics, motivational 
components, content particularities, and offence-related components. The statement is read and 
then assessed against these criteria (Oberlader et al., 2016).  
According to Köhnken (2004) certain criteria when they are present are indicative of 
honesty as they are theorised to be too complex to fabricated, these criteria are; the statement has 
a coherent and logical structure, the statement consists of a high amount of detail, and finally the 
information in the statement is not structured in a chronological order. Other criteria according to 
CBCA theory which indicate honesty include, the presence of spontaneous corrections and the 
fact the provider will admit that they are not entirely sure of the memory via phrases such as “I 
think”. 
When testing the efficacy of SVA via the CBCA criteria Vrij (2008) found evidence that 
it could correctly differentiate between truth and lies. It was found that truthful statements 
typically scored higher in the amount of CBCA criteria. On average, CBCA could correctly 
differentiate between truth and lie 71% of the time Vrij (2008). Several studies looked at CBCA 
(Akehurst et al., 2001; Parker, & Brown, 2000). Generally, studies support the basic assumption 
of CBCA; that truthful statements are richer in detail and are based on actual experienced events 
(Akehurst et al., 2001; Parker, & Brown, 2000). Additionally, empirical evidence for CBCA 
comes from Vrij (2005) vote-counting study and the meta-analysis conducted by DePaulo and 
colleagues (2003). Truth-tellers generally included more details in their statements and had more 
corrections that are spontaneous and were more logically structured (DePaulo et al., 2003). The 
use of CBCA in forensic settings is not without its criticisms as stipulated in Hauch, Sporer, 
Masip and Blandon-Gitlin (2017) study. The researchers found that should CBCA be used in 
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forensics settings, there needs to be rigorous guidelines as to how the CBCA experts need to 
evaluate the presence of each criteria (Hauch et al., 2017). 
Reality Monitoring.  Reality monitoring is based on work which focuses on memory. 
Reality monitoring is more prevalent in deception research conducted by researchers rather than 
professionals working in the forensic fields. The central premise of reality monitoring is that 
differences exist between memories which are real and those which are fictious in nature 
(Johnson, & Raye, 1998). Although not originally designed to separate truth from lie, the reality 
monitoring approach is showing great promise (Oberlader et al., 2016; Vrij et al., 2015b). 
According to reality monitoring thought; memories that are based on actual experiences will 
contain perception details (i.e. information derived from the five senses) as well as contextual 
details (i.e. details concerned with where the incident occurred, or where an object or person was 
located) (Vrij et al., 2015b).  Reality Monitoring also holds that memories based on real 
experiences tend to be richer in details pertaining to time (i.e. the story being told will have a 
sense of chronological order to it) (Vrij et al., 2015b). A false memory typically is typically less 
clear and tends to be vaguer in details (Vrij et al., 2015b). When applied to deception detection, 
reality monitoring believes that truths are based on external information where lies are based on 
internal information (Sporer, 2004). 
Studies investigating the efficacy of reality monitoring generally find that its ability to 
distinguish between truth and lie was similar to that of CBCA (Masip, Sporer, Garrido, & 
Herrero, 2005; Vrij, 2008). On average, reality monitoring scored a 69% accuracy rating when 
differentiating between truth and lie, specifically, it was found that truthful accounts did have 
more perceptual and contextual details (Vrij et al., 2015b). Reality monitoring has shown greater 
amounts of inter-rater reliability when compared to that of CBCA (Strömwall et al., 2004). This 
has been attributed to its simplicity of application. Sporer (1997) also found that reality 
monitoring’s criteria to be more precise and therefore easier to operationalise when compared to 
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CBCA’s criteria. Contemporary research has found that certain RM criteria holds more efficacy 
in discerning truth from lies and can even be applied to discerning between intended future acts 
of deceit and honesty (Giolla, Ask, Granhag, & Karisson, 2019). The specific criteria are; 
cognitive operations, clarity, reconstructability and realism (Giolla et al., 2019), and argues that 
these criteria should be used using RM to distinguish between truth and lies, especially when 
using it to discern intended acts of deceit.  
Psycholinguistics and deception.  Linguistic cues are those features of language such as 
the types of words used, and the manner in which those words are stringed together, in other 
words, the structure and grammar of the messages. Furthermore, Burgoon (2018) argued that the 
linguistic features of language exist regardless and independent of the context or medium of the 
communication. There exists empirical evidence that systematic differences exist between 
truthful and deceptive witness accounts (Fuller, Biros, Burgoon & Nunamaker, 2013; Joffe, 
1992; Zapamiuk, Yuille, Taylor, 1995). In addition, to these systematic differences, studies have 
shown that linguistic differences do exist between truthful and deceptive statements whether 
under controlled conditions (i.e. a laboratory environment) or under actual field conditions. 
(Burgoon & Qin, 2006; Hancock, Woodworth, & Goorha, 2010). 
Newman, Pennebaker, Berry and Richards (2003) used psycholinguistics to identified 
several language or linguistic features that could be used to determine if deceit was present in a 
written statement or account. Those features identified by Newman and colleagues (2003) 
included; deceivers typically showing lower levels of cognitive complexity, used more negative 
emotion words, and had fewer references to both the self and others in their statements compared 
to truthteller’s statements.  
Walker, Vogl and Thompson (1999) found truth-tellers resorted to using more positive 
emotion words when discussing life events. Walker et al., (1999) explained this finding by 
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saying that these events were positively biased. Walker, Skowronski and Thompson (2003) 
explained this phenomenon by using the fading-effect bias. According to the fading-effect bias, 
negative memories fade faster than positive memories, thereby reducing the amount of negative 
emotionally charged words in a truthful account (Walker et al, 2003). Negative emotionally 
charged words are associated with shame and guilt (Eckman, 1992; Vrij, 2008), hence these 
types of words are more likely to be used by liars. In 2015 Vrij, Fisher and Blank concluded that 
because deceitful communication increases the cognitive load experienced, the words used by 
the deceiver are simpler. This finding was later replicated by Jupe, Vrij, Leal and Nahari (2019) 
that differences existed between truth-tellers and deceivers when cognitive load was a factor at 
play.  Cognitive process words e.g. ‘ought’ etc and cause words such as ‘hence’, ‘because’ etc 
are often used by liars. (Sporer, & Schwandt, 2007).  
A major problem with reviewing psycholinguistics and deception studies is that studies 
are reporting dissimilar results. It was found that deceivers used fewer words, but longer 
sentences (Haunch, Blandón-Gitlin, Masip & Sporer, 2015). Additionally, Haunch et al., (2015) 
found that contrary to what one would expect deceivers did not use fewer past tense verbs. 
As such one solution offered by Burgoon (2018) to reconcile these different results is 
classify linguistic markers into groups and examine if any clear patterns emerge. In the case of 
non-verbal indicators there is and has been this misconceived notion that there exist universal 
cues to detecting deception, and these universal cues are context dependent and stable (Frank & 
Eckman, 1997). However, when it comes to the linguistic indicators of deceit, research argues 
that it is dependent on various factors e.g. the type of deception (for example is it a deliberate 
concealment of information or is it a fabricated story), the event type and the emotional valence 
(Buller, Burgoon, Buslig & Rogers, 1996). Furthermore, both Zhou and colleagues (2004) and 
Burgoon and Qin (2006) found that the linguistic markers or deceit are dynamic in nature. A 
brief overview of some linguistic indicators follows.  
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Quantity  refers to the length of a statement. It is often measured using a count of 
syllables, types of words e.g. nouns, verbs etc. or loquacity (talk time) (Burgoon, 2018). The 
early idea was that truth-tellers would be forthcoming, whereas, deceptive communicators would 
not be so forthcoming when communicating with the intention to reduce the likelihood that they 
would be discovered (ten-Brinke & Porter, 2012). However, two meta-analysis conducted by 
DePaulo and colleagues (2003) and Hartwig and Bond (2011) respectively found mixed results 
when it came to looking at quantity as an indicator of deceit. One explanation offered is that 
there are many instances where deceivers intentionally decide to give longer statements 
(Burgoon, 2018) For example, interactive experiments have yielded results which indicate when 
afforded the chance to plan and prepare their lies, deceivers tend to provide longer statements 
(Burgoon et.al., 2015; Dunbar et al., 2014; Zhou et al., 2004). This increase in loquacity may 
occur due to the deceiver trying to be more persuasive. 
Specificity is concerned with the level of detail provided by a statement (Burgoon, 2018). 
In essence specificity just serves as concrete operationalisation of quantity. Legal testimony is 
often coded using SVA, CBCA and Reality Monitoring (Johson & Raye, 1981; Undeutsch, 1989; 
Vrij, 2008). When determining veracity of statements, these techniques look at sensory details, 
spatiotemporal references etc. In truthful statements there is a greater amount of detail (Burgoon, 
2018). This assertion is based on the premise that during a retelling of a truthful event, the person 
will able to recall a greater level of detail. Two theories support this claim namely, Information 
Manipulation Theory and Information Management Theory as these theories argue that to detect 
deception one needs to manipulate the quantity of details (McCornack, 1992; Burgoon, Buller, 
Guerrero, Afifi, & Feldman, 1996). 
Lexical complexity refers to either lexical or syntactic complexity when it comes to using 
language to detect deception. (Burgoon, Buller, Ebesu, & Rockwell, 1994). Lexical complexity 
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is concerned with whether, simple of difficult words are used, measured by the number of letter 
or syllables (Burgoon et al., 1994). Syntactic complexity is concerned with whether simple 
sentences were used of if sentences with multiple clauses were used, measured by punctuations 
etc (Burgoon et al, 1994). Because of the cognitive complexity of lying there are less cognitive 
resources available and as such the speaker may opt to use less complex language (Qin, Burgoon 
& Nunamaker, 2004). However, when investigating lexical complexity Hauch et al., (2015) did 
not find a simpler lexical structure when looking at a deceptive statement.  
Diversity speaks to each lexical item in a given statement and how unique or redundant 
they are. Diversity is often measured using the Type-Token Ratio (TTR). To obtain the TTR one 
simply “divides the number of distinct word types by the total number of words in the statement” 
(Porter, & Yuille, 1996 p. 446). According to Hollien (1990), in order to maintain credibility, 
people who are providing false testimony display low levels of lexical diversity. s their language 
behaviour becomes more stereotypical. Additionally, non-diverse language is indicated by 
repeated words and phrases. Repetitive language is considered a sign of a deceptive statement as 
it is the result of a reduced state of mental resources available to the speaker and therefore, the 
speaker reverts to using less advanced vocabulary and does not construct complex statement 
(Burgoon, 2018), Hauch et al., (2015) found that deceivers used sentences with fewer diverse 
wording and in general had a lower TTR. 
Hedging or uncertainty speaks to the phrases or words and the sentence structure of the 
statements which introduce ambiguity, evasiveness and vagueness (DePaulo, 2018). According 
to Duran, Hall, McCarthy & McNamara (2010) deceivers may make use of ambiguity and 
vagueness to avoid detection by indicating lack of conviction when it comes to their stories being 
questioned. Thus, certainty in language conveys confidence in which is typical of truthful-tellers 
(Fuller, Biros & Wilson, 2009).  
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Immediacy and Personalism refers to how the language used creates a sense of closeness, 
or rather how that person takes ownership of what they say or think (Zhou et al, 2004). If the 
statement generated contains a mixture of the passive voice and using both the past and the 
future tenses then generally the person has provided a non-immediate sentence or statement 
(Wiener, & Mehrabian, 1968). Additionally, using the third person pronoun decreases the sense 
of immediacy. Deceivers, in order to disassociate themselves from their falsified narrative 
(Newman et al., 2003), often use non-immediate and impersonalised pronouns. Hauch, Blandón-
Gitlin, Masip, and Sporer, (2015) found that the difference in language profiles between truthful 
and deceptive statements lies within the types of pronouns used. In the case of truth, there is a 
tendency to utilise first-person singular pronouns. In the case of deceit, more second and third 
person pronouns tend to be found. 
Most displays of deception can be said to have some affective cause. It has been said that 
deceivers are seen to have been experiencing feelings of guilt, anxiety and the fear of being 
caught in the act of being deceitful. These fears then prompt uncontrollable and unconscious 
leakage of cues associated with deception (Buller & Burgoon, 1996; Ekman, 2009). What isn’t 
clear, however, is if these emotional states which are leaked through, generate negative valanced 
language. Both Bond and Lee (2005) and Vrij, Edwards, Roberts and Bull (2000) suggest that 
guilt is reflected in high amounts of negative emotion words.  However, Burgoon et al., (2015) 
found contradictory evidence to the previous findings. Burgoon and colleagues found that 
deceivers deliberately used more positive and hyperbolic language when they were trying to be 
persuasive. In the same year, Hauch et al., (2015) found the converse to Burgoon et al., (2015) as 
they found more negative emotion words trend towards more positive emotion words being used 
by liars. This finding led Hauch and colleagues (2015) to make the tentative assertion that 
compared to truth-tellers, deceivers used more emotionally charged words.  
AN INVESTIGATION OF  LIE BIAS AND COGNITIVE LOAD 
 
34 
Burgoon (2018) asserts that both motivation and modality act as moderators to linguistic 
indicators of deception. In terms of motivation, the extant literature, centred on deception has 
argued that motivations effects both the sender in terms of their display of cues associated with 
deceit, and the receiver’s ability to detect deception (Burgoon, & Floyd, 2000). However, a 
major criticism of this literature is that they focused on low-stake, mundane lies (Bachenko, 
Fitzpatrick, & Schonwetter, 2008; Buller, & Burgoon, 2008; Frank & Ekman, 1997, Vrij, 2008). 
As a result of this criticism, researchers have begun investigating whether motivation facilitates 
or inhibits detection accuracy in high-stake lies.  
DePaulo, Kirkendol, Tang, & O’Brien (1988) furthered the research during the early 
years of deception by investigating the motivation impairment affect hypothesis. According to 
this hypothesis motivated liars become easier to detect or rather their intention becomes more 
transparent if judges can only make use of non-verbal cues. This implies motivation impairs non-
verbal performance but improves verbal performance when someone is trying to be deceptive 
(DePaulo et al., 1988). In 2000 Burgoon and Floyd took this one step further, the researchers 
took several operationalised definitions of motivation and applied it to the deception detection. 
They concluded that if there was a high degree of motivation to detect deception then detection 
accuracy rates would be improved regardless if non-verbal cues or if verbal cues were used 
(Burgoon & Floyd, 2000). It was also found that highly motivated liars who made use mediums 
other than face-to-face communication such as instant messaging platforms could often manage 
to deceive their partners (Hancock, Woodworth, & Goorha, 2010). Thus, indicating that high 
levels of motivation may hinder the ability to detect the presence of a lie or deceit. 
Modality and its influence on communication is a well-documented phenomenon. It has 
been found that the mode of communication influences how people speak. When speaking in 
person; it is often more informal, however, when using email, it is more formal (Burgoon, 2018). 
The study concluded that the modality in and of itself will result in differences in language used. 
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For example, in a face-to-face communication, a deceiver needs to create a credible story and 
therefore is more likely to be constantly aware of their impression and the feedback being 
received from the receivers (Burgoon, 2018). However, when using written modalities, 
communicators are able to edit and plan their messages before sending and can therefore focus 
on the linguistic aspect of the message (Burgoon, 2018).  
A review of the literature has yielded the following characteristics that are often present 
in a deceptive statement. Liars tend to provide fewer details when speaking, and a result of this, 
their statements will often contain less word than truthful statements (Burgoon et al., 2003; Vrij, 
2000). This is because of how cognitively taxing telling a lie is, and how hesitant they are in 
providing too much detail which they may be questioned on, which may betray they are lying if 
they are inconsistent in their stories. Secondly, liars typically use less pronouns overall and 
specifically less first-person pronouns to dissociate and create distance between themselves and 
the deceit (DePaulo et al., 2003; Newman et al., 2003). DePaulo and colleagues (2003) also 
concluded that liars also used a greater number of third-person pronouns to further facilitate this 
dissociation. Fourthly, liars typically used more positive and less negative words than truth-
tellers in order to make their deception more believable (Burgoon et al., 2003) 
One of the major developments that came from the increased focus of research in terms 
of psycholinguistics and deception, was taking machine learning and Natural Language 
Processes (NLPs) and using them to detect deception in communication. 
Using computers to sort the lies from the truths. With the advent and rise of machine 
learning techniques, it is now possible to use computers to detect the presence of deceit, at least 
in theory (Nortje & Tredoux, 2019). These machine learning techniques are often used in natural 
language processing techniques. Examples of commonly used machine learning techniques 
include Bag-of-Words (BoW), n-grams and other styles which look at linguistic style approaches 
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(Hernández-Castañeda & Calvo, 2017). It should be noted, that although n-grams yield 
acceptable results, they generally perform better when they are augmented with other NLP 
techniques (Hernández-Castañeda & Calvo, 2017). NLPs make use of computational linguistics 
to detect deception by the text being processed and turned into vectors of various features 
(Hernández-Castañeda & Calvo, 2017). A wide variety of techniques have been developed in 
order to try and detect deception from using physiological sensors such as the polygraph as 
explained above to using neuroscience techniques (Davatzikos et al., 2005; Ganis, Kosslyn, 
Stose, Thompson & Yurgelun-Todd, 2003). However, more recently many techniques have been 
developed to detect deception at the communication level. However, finding universal cues is 
proving to be a challenge. One solution offered is to make use of statistical and machine learning 
techniques to detect these cues to deception. 
Linguistic Inquiry Word Count (LIWC), a software programme, is widely used to 
construct language profiles and evaluate these to differentiate between truthful statements and 
deceptive ones. Additionally, when conducting research in this paradigm researchers use the 
categories as constructed and defined by LWIC (Pennebaker, Francois, & Booth, 2001). 
LIWC analyses texts against predefined dictionaries to classify words into psychologically 
meaningful categories and reports the number of words in each category (Tausczik & 
Pennebaker, 2010). For an accurate classification, LIWC relies on meticulous and carefully 
constructed dictionaries (Nortje & Tredoux, 2019). LIWC has been used to study several areas 
including personality, psychological adjustment and mental health (Alpers et al., 2005; Mairesse, 
Walker, Mehl, & Moore, 2007; Rude, Gortner, & Pennebaker, 2004) 
LIWC has successfully been used to correctly differentiate between truthful and 
deceptive texts. These combinations of verbal cues have resulted in a successful detection rate of 
between 67%-70%. Newman et al. (2003) collected a corpus of both truthful and falsified 
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statements across five experiments. In terms of the first three experiments that were conducted, 
participants were expected to express both their true opinions and a contradictory opinion on a 
topic. The first study made use of orally recorded transcriptions, study two and three made use of 
either written communication that was typed or hand-written respectfully. These were then put 
through LIWC and the authors achieved 61% correct classification of truthful compared to 
deceptive accounts score overall. The subset of LIWC which differentiated between truthful and 
deceptive communication were motion words, both self-references and references to another 
person, the total number of exclusive words and finally negative emotion words. 
Newman et al. (2003) argued that this subset could be used to differentiate between a 
truthful and deceptive account because a high number of self-references show that the person is 
taking ownership of the expected quality of the communication process, whereas liars tended to 
make use of fewer self-references in order to dissociate themselves from the interaction. 
Newman and colleagues (2003) also found a lower number of references to another person in lies 
when compared to that of a truth. However, Vrij (2000) found that there is a greater number of 
other references when telling a lie. DePaulo et al. (2003), meta-analysis did not find any 
differences in references to others between lies and truths. As such, there is no consensus on this, 
Newman et al (2003) responded this and said that they may have had a higher number of 
references to other people due to their manipulation. They asked participants to give opinions on 
abortion attitudes, and this would result in a greater number of references to another person. 
Newman and colleagues (2003) believed that exclusive words (e.g. “but”, “rather”, “however”) 
were an indication of cognitive complexity as they were used to distinguish between alternating 
concepts. Research has indicated that when it comes the use of exclusive words, liars tended to 
use less (Newman et al., 2010). Newman et al (2003) also found that lies contained a greater 
number of negative emotion words. According to Vrij (2000) this increase in negative emotion 
words could be attributed to feelings of guilt and anxiety associated with the act of lying. 
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In 2005 Bond & Lee applied LIWC to a random sample of truthful and deceptive 
transcripts of oral statements provided by inmates. Overall, it was found that deceivers scored 
lower on the LWIC category sensory details than truth-tellers. Mihalcea and Strapparava (2009) 
used LIWC categories on a sample of one-hundred truthful and false opinions when it came to 
conversational topics. They obtained a 70% success rate of detecting deception by making use of 
NLPs. 
Similarly, Pérez-Rosas and Mihalcea (2014) investigated if it was possible to use 
machine learning techniques to detect deception cross culturally, when one considered each 
culture individually and then built in specific cultural deception indicators. The study yielded a 
correct classification between 60-70%. Hence, it was concluded that one could use cross-cultural 
deception indicators to detect deception (Pérez-Rosas & Mihalcea, 2014). 
Williams, Talwar, Lindsay, Bala, and Lee (2014) compared the lies told by children and 
those told by adults when it came to the language used. There were two groups and half of each 
group told a lie and the remaining half told a truth. The researchers used LIWC to generate the 
classification samples. The study showed that differences existed in the language profile of a 
deceptive versus a truthful statement. These differences mainly took the form of certain linguistic 
variables e.g., the use of both singular and plural self-references as well as, differences in both 
positive and negative valanced language (Williams et al., 2014).  
There are advantages to using programmes such as LIWC to try and detect the presence 
of deception in a written account. One such advantage is that LIWC is able to determine 
emotionally charged words (Tauszcik, & Pennebaker, 2010). Another advantage of LIWC, and 
NLPs by extension is its inability to assimilate biases, as these programmes are not likely to be 
susceptible to stereotypes (Hauch et al. 2014). Furthermore, human evaluators or judges may 
become mentally taxed and exhausted after a prolonged interaction of trying to decide if a piece 
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is deceptive or not. For example, LIWC outperformed human judges when classifying opinions 
on abortion as truthful vs non-truthful. LIWC correctly classified these statements 67% of the 
time, whereas, human judges on 52% of time (Newman et al. 2003). According to Levine (2014) 
human judges tend to be truth-biased, in other words, they enter the conversation with the 
assumption that people are going to speak the truth. 
It should also be noted that with the advances of our understanding of how machine 
learning works, machine learning has allowed for simple NLP models to accurately and correctly 
detect fake hotel reviews regardless if they these reviews were positive or negative (Ott, Cardie 
& Hancock, 2013). Using machine learning techniques Ott et al., (2013) scored an 86% accuracy 
rate when detecting fake negative reviews. Where in contrast, human judges scored an accuracy 
rating of 61.5% when detecting false negative reviews. 
However, although this novel approach, shows promise, it is not without its criticism. It’s 
major fall back is the fact that its algorithms are ‘black boxes.’ Simply put, this means that it is 
very difficult to discern how exactly these algorithms detect the presence of deception in written 
statements. Additional disadvantages of these types of programmes are that they ignore 
figurative language and contexts e.g. sarcasm, irony and idiomatic expressions. 
Deception and second language 
Recent developments in the field of detecting deception assess the impact that a speaker’s 
language proficiency has on the speaker’s credibility (Evans, Pimetal, Pena, & Michael, 2017). 
Several studies in this field, such as those conducted by Cheng and Broadhurst (2005), Da Silva 
and Leach (2013) and Lev-Ari and Keysar, (2010) indicate that veracity assessments of native 
language statements were more likely to be judged as truthful compared to statements provided 
in non-native languages. 
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However, these studies looking at the impact of second language has on veracity 
assessment has yielded inconsistent results. These dissimilar results have been explained by 
stating that these studies vary in both design and methodology, making comparisons between 
them difficult. In terms of their analysis certain studies have reported only on signal detection 
theory analysis and its relation to detecting deception only and others have reported on accuracy 
only. 
Two main research directions emerge in attempts to clarify the differences between 
truthful versus deceptive statements made in one’s native versus one’s non-native tongue: (a) 
research that focuses on the cognitive load approach, and (b) research that stems from the 
domain of language psychology, which argues that there is greater emotional distance from the 
content of the statement when lying in a non-native language (Suchotzki, & Gamer, 2018).  
Cladwell-Harris (2014) study is an example of the second research avenue indicated 
above; the researcher investigated the emotional content differences between native and foreign 
languages. According to the researcher, one’s native tongue is acquired within an emotional 
context, where second languages are typically acquired or learned in a more rational academic 
context.  The researcher proposed that words learned or acquired within a specific context, 
triggers an emotion related to the original context when used later.  Researchers therefore argue 
that judging native and foreign languages relies on distinct processes.  Evaluating second 
language communication is described as a more rational decision-making event whereas native 
tongue language communication evaluation shifts towards emotion-influenced events.  This 
distinction between the different mental processes allows for emotional distancing to occur in 
evaluating second language communication (Cladwell-Harris, 2014) and this in turn could 
influence the veracity judgement of a message or statement.  
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Some studies argue that speaking in one’s second language in and of itself introduces 
cognitive load onto the speaker (Da Silva, 2011; Evans et al., 2013, Evans, & Michael, 2014). 
Since the deceiver must suppress the truth, construct a credible story and constantly monitor their 
credibility increases the amount of cognitive load placed on the non-native speaker (Evans, & 
Michael, 2014). Furthermore, this increase occurs because the neural processing of the brain 
comes under increased demand when one speaks in a non-native tongue. This increased neural 
processing is attributed to more motor neurons being fired in the brain as these neurons are 
involved with the grammar of speech, thus resulting in it becoming more difficult for second 
language speakers to engage in conversation (Perani, & Abutalebi, 2005). 
Research has indicated that relative to speaking in one’s native tongue, speaking in a non-
native tongue is more cognitively taxing (Akca, & Elkilic, 2011; Ardila, 2003). Ullman (2001) 
explains this phenomenon by saying this increase in neural activity is linked to explicit memory 
processes when conversing in one’s non-native tongue. According to Ullman (2001) when 
conversing in one’s second language it is harder to actively engage in word recall. Therefore, 
indicating that second language speakers have fewer words to their disposal when constructing a 
deceptive statement. 
It has been found that differences exist between native and non-native speakers. Studies 
have argued that speaking in one’s second language reduces one’s working memory span 
(Service, Simola, Metsanheimo, & Maury, 2002). And as a result of this may be slower at 
recognising words or slower to make lexical decisions (Gollan, & Acenas, 2004). Thus, 
contributing to the increase in cognitive load experienced by non-native speakers. Research has 
also found that differences in arousal level exist when looking at a person when they are 
speaking their first language compared to when they are speaking their second language. Both 
Dewaele (2008) and Keysar, Hayakawa and An (2012) found that those who are speaking in 
their second language experience less emotional intensity. Behaviourally speaking, it was found 
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that when lying in their non-native language, participants exhibited increased pupil dilation and 
had longer utterances (Duñabeitia, & Costa, 2015) 
Although much of the research done to date has primarily focused on the idea that lying 
is more cognitively taxing than being honest, it has been suggested by both lay and scientific 
enquiry that lying is also more emotionally arousing (Zuckerman, DePaulo, & Rosenthal, 1981). 
When asked people how they felt when lying in their non-native language, people reported that 
they felt tenser and experienced greater levels of stress when lying when compared to being 
honest (Caso, Gnici, Vrij, & Mann, 2005). Abe, Suzuki, Mori, Itoh, and Fujii (2007) found 
further evidence to suggest that lying is emotionally more arousing using functional MRIs. Abe 
and colleagues (2007) found that there was an increase in activity in the amygdala, the brain 
region which is involved emotional processing when participants were being deceptive.  
Research from the disciplines of linguistics, psychology and psychophysiology indicated 
that when participants spoke in the second language, they experienced lower levels of emotional 
arousal when compared to speaking in their home language (Dewaele, 2004). Furthermore, when 
listening to emotionally charged phrases such as reprimands when younger, results in less skin 
conductance if these reprimands are delivered in a second language when compared to when they 
are said in the native tongue (Caldwell-Harris & Ayçiçeği-Dinn, 2009). Hence, Suchotzki and 
Gamer, (2018) conclude that being deceptive in one second language results in lower levels of 
emotional arousal, which in turn facilitates the act of lying or deceit.  
Research further suggests that second language speakers have a harder time getting away 
with deception due to this accompanying increase in cognitive load, as one would need to split 
the cognitive resources between working memory and that of creating a story. This makes 
attention-switching tasks more challenging. Hence, second language speakers are argued to leak 
a greater number of cues which indicate deception (Da Silva, 2011). This statement is 
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problematic though. According to Gregersen (2005), those who speaking in their non-native 
tongue likely engage in activities associated with being deceptive simply because they are 
nervous, and because of this they may appear to be being deceptive.  
In 2005 Cheng and Broadhurst investigated the ability of receivers of a message to detect 
deception if they heard both statements made in the speaker’s native language and their 
(speaker’s) non-native language. Statements were given by Cantonese speaking individuals, both 
in their native tongue (Cantonese) and in English but those who identified as second language 
English speaking individuals. The researchers found that second language speakers displayed 
behaviours attributed to lying and experienced a lie bias towards them. It was also found that 
those who spoke in their non-native tongue i.e. their second language they would be judged as 
being deceptive compared to first language speakers (Cheng, & Broadhurst, 2005). 
Caldwell-Harris and Ayçiçeği-Dinn (2009) conducted a study which sought to establish 
whether there was a preference in language used when telling a lie. Participants listened to 
emotionally charged phrases in both their native and non-native tongues. Results of this study 
found that participants reported lower skin conductance rates when hearing emotional phrases 
which were spoken in their non-native tongue. The authors also asked the same participants to 
read both truthful and untruthful statements in both their first language and their second 
language. Results from the study indicated that there was a higher level of skin conductance, 
when participants were being deceitful in their non-native tongue compared to when they were 
lying in their native tongue Thus, lending strength to the argument that people may leak cues 
associated with deceit when conversing in their non-native tongue. 
Da Silva and Leach (2013) conducted a study in which Canadian students’ accuracy 
when judging deception was evaluated. They found that students tended to judge those who 
provided a statement in their first language where seen as being truthful i.e. there was a truth bias 
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extended towards them. Furthermore, Da Silva and Leach (2013) found that when making 
veracity assessments, participants extended a lie bias towards those statements which were 
generated in the speakers second language. This lie bias was also found by Meissner and Kassin 
in 2002. Meissner and Kassin (2002) also found that this lie bias was extended even if you were 
a professional who was trained forensically e.g. law officials also extended this lie bias.  
Some studies have reported that a speaker’s language proficiency plays a role in an 
individual’s ability to either correctly identify the presence of a lie or correctly reject the absence 
of a lie (Evans et al., 2017). A contemporary study conducted by Leach, Snellings and Gazaille 
(2017) sought to investigate whether language proficiency influenced one’s ability to detect the 
presence of deception. Both first language and second language English speakers were filmed 
whilst telling a truth or a lie. Both native and non-native English laypersons were asked to watch 
these recordings. Leach and colleagues (2017) found that when participants watch and heard the 
native English speakers, they extended a truth bias towards them i.e. those recordings were 
judged as truthful. When reviewing second language recordings, participants judged these as 
being lies in other words, they extended a lie bias.  
Snelling (2013) investigated if a truth bias was extended to those speaking their native 
tongue. The results yielded by the study indicated that level of language proficiency did indeed 
impact the ability to discern truth from lie. In addition to this finding, the study also found that 
native speakers were extended a truth bias when their statements were being reviewed by a 
reviewer with a high level of proficiency for that language.  
Solodukin (2015) investigated if sender’s language proficiency could influence receiver 
veracity judgement bias. Solodukin (2015) tested the receiver’s ability to make correct veracity 
assessments on senders who had varying degrees of proficiency of the English language. As with 
previous research Solodukin (2015) found that receivers were truth-biased to native speakers. 
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This could then imply that there is indeed a lie bias extended to those who speak in their second 
language. The studies result also suggest that language proficiency play a role in receiver’s 
judgements as judges were least accurate in their veracity assessments of the basic second 
language category. 
Studies which have investigated responses biases and second language have yielded more 
consistent results than those looking at the impact of second language on veracity assessments 
(Costillo, Tyson, & Mallard, 2014; Evans & Michael, 2014) and that a lie-bias is extended to 
non-native speakers (Castillo et al., 2014) or at the very least a very minor truth-bias to native 
speakers (Evans & Michael, 2014). 
A review of the extant literature has offered some potential reasons why these bias (truth 
and lie) phenomena exists toward native vs non-native speakers. According to Wang, Zue, Chen, 
Xue and Dong (2007) when one speaks in their non-native language must inhibited neural 
control mechanisms which would have them speaking and responding in their native tongue. 
This then results in an increase in cognitive load experienced by the second language speaker. As 
a result of this increase in cognitive load, non-native speakers may exhibit cues which are 
associated with lying such as being less fluent, nervousness and fidgeting (Wang et al., 2007). 
These behaviours are typically only displayed when second language speakers are expected to 
communicate in their second language. Furthermore, these biases may potentially exist because 
those speaking in their second language may provide stories which are less rich in details, which 
lie-tellers also tend to do (Cheng & Broadhurst, 2005; DePaulo et al., 2003). 
As a result, people may misattribute these naturally occurring tendencies when the 
speaker speaks in their second language as being indicative of lying. This could potentially 
explain the truth-bias extended to people who communicate in their first language, and the lie 
bias extended to those who speaking in their second language. 
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Evans et al. (2017) asked participants to provide four statements which were auto-
biographical and opinion-based statements. These statements were either truthful or deceptive in 
nature. Observers were asked to rate if they felt if these were either truth or false statements. 
Observers accuracy at correctly classifying the statement as a truth or a lie was highest for group 
which was the least proficient English language group. This finding suggests that lie detection 
would be facilitated if a speaker were to provide a statement in their non-native language (Evans 
et al., 2017).  
People tend to go into a conversation with the intent to believe someone is telling them 
the truth, in other words they are extended a truth-bias. And in turn this bias results in a truth-
based credibility judgement (DePaulo et al, 2003; Vrij, 2008). A potential explanation for this 
truth-bias is offered by O’Sullivan, Ekman, and Freisen (1988). According to O’Sullivan and 
colleagues (1988) on average people are exposed to a greater amount of truthful behaviour daily 
and therefore people believe that deceptive behaviour is rare. As a result, they expect people to 
be honest in their interactions. Street and Richardson (2015) argued that because of this greater 
based truth rate, people judged others as being truthful rather than deceptive. Vrij and Baxter 
(1999) also offer another explanation for people being truth-biased, and their argument lies in 
social norms. According to Vrij and Baxter (1999) it would be considered impolite to constantly 
question another’s credibility  
Contemporary research has found a clear bias being extended to non-native speakers. 
Results from these contemporary studies indicate that the less proficient one is in speaking the 
language, the less truthful they are perceived to be (Dragojevic, & Giles, 2016; Hansen, & 
Dovidio, 2016). This is because if a speaker has an accent the statement may be judged deceptive 
as it harder to understand (Akehurst, Arnhold, Figueiredo, Turtle & Leach, 2018). It has been 
found that perceptual fluency increases believability of a message (Unkelbach, 2007). 
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Research has also suggested that non-native speakers exhibit language which is 
associated with deceit. Non-native speakers tended to use simpler words, as well as more 
concrete words as it was easier for them to access these words and non-native speakers avoided 
using abstract terms, as these are more cognitive complex to use (Newman et al., 2003). Kormos 
and Dénes (2004) found that non-native speech was less diverse than native speech and was 
more redundant and was repetitive. These are the same characteristics and patterns which are 
associated with deceptive speech according to studies (Arciuli, Mallard, & Villar, 2010; Zhou et 
al., 2014) 
Conclusion of literature review  
The bulk of the deception literature finds that people are generally poor at detecting when 
someone is lying to them (Bond & DePaulo, 2006; DePaulo et al., 2003). Various techniques 
have been proposed, refined and tested as research in the area of detection of deception. Initially 
physiological measures and the observation of non-verbal cues associated with deception were 
thought to be the best indicators of deceit.  Contemporary avenues of research focus on the 
language and language constructs used by deceivers. There is also a focus on various 
interviewing styles to induce measures of cognitive strain on the deceiver to facilitate the 
detection of the deceit (Vrij, 2018). The literature indicates that the field of study concerned with 
the use of computer programmes to aid in deception detection is promising, but also that these 
evolving techniques are not without their criticisms. Further, fields of enquiry into the influence 
of language proficiency on veracity assessments indicates that a communicator’s language 
proficiency impacts on a receiver’s veracity assessment of the message. 
Rationale  
This study was restricted to the three dominant languages used in the Western Cape being 
those of Afrikaans, isiXhosa and English. The 2011 census, as reported by southafrica-info.com, 
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found that these three languages represent 98.8% of the reported first languages in the Western 
Cape province.  Table 1 summarises the percentage usage for the three languages as a first 
language at provincial level (Western Cape only) and at a national level both first and second 
language percentages.   
Table 1 
 isiXhosa, Afrikaans and English Language % users in South Africa  
 
Western Cape  
(% of WC population) 
National Statistics (% of RSA population) 
1st language users 1st language  2nd language  Combined share 
isiXhosa 24.7% 16.0 % 21.2% 37.2% 
Afrikaans 53.8% 13.5 % 19.9% 33.4% 
English 20.3% 9.6% 21.2% 30.8% 
Note:  
% use of total population of 51.77 million people (2011 census) 
Source: https://southafrica-info.com 
Despite having 11 official languages, and only being spoken by 9.6% of the overall 
population in South Africa as a first language and 20.3% at Western Cape provincial level, 
English remains the lingua franca of the country.  This means that most people (90.4% at 
national level, 79.7% at Western Cape provincial level) have to communicate or transact in a 
non-native language, being English, on day-to-day routine and business dealings.  
 Although sparse, the literature pertaining to second language use and perceptions of 
deception indicates that receivers of communication are prone to demonstrating biases that are 
functions of whether the communication being received is by a native or non-native language 
speaker of the communication language. The studies report that a truth bias is likely to be 
extended to those speaking in their native-tongue and a lie-bias when the speaker is engaging in 
their non-native tongue (Cheng, & Broadhurst, 2005; Da Silva, & Leach, 2013; Lev-Ari, & 
Keysar, 2010) 
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If indeed a lie bias is preferentially extended to non-native speakers it disadvantages the 
non-native speaker.  Within the South African context, both at national (90.2% of the population) 
and at Western Cape provincial level (79.7% of provincial population) of people could be prone 
to be subject to bias. 
The ability to correctly detect when someone is lying has often been compared to that of 
a coin toss i.e. there is a fifty percent chance of identifying it such. Literature reviews indicate 
that the notion of placing cognitive load on the individual while they are trying to lie, improves 
the ability of someone to correctly discern whether they are being lied to or not (Vrij et al, 2008; 
Walczyk et al., 2013). If the addition of cognitive load at the time of statement gathering makes 
it easier to discern whether someone was lying or not when evaluating a written, or transcribed 
verbal statement, it could be of benefit to a number of applications including, but not limited to 
forensic investigations. 
The number of studies published within the last decade to detect deception in written 
statements has grown significantly. This task is often undertaken by making use of natural 
language processing (NLP) programmes. These programmes typically outperform humans when 
it comes to correctly identifying when deceit is evident in the written statement. This study used 
the Linguistic Inquiry Word Count program with its 2015 dictionary version to assess this line of 
research. 
In summary, the results of the study are relevant within the multi-lingual South African 
context as it would determine whether biases (lie or truth) are prevalent in South Africa based on 
whether the communication is being done in a native (first) or non-native (second) language.  
The study also assesses whether cognitive load and the use of NLPs in assessing transcribed 
statements improves the detection of deception accuracy rates compared to human judges; the 
outcome thereof is relevant to professions reliant on information collected from statements.  
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Specific Aims and Hypotheses 
The aims of this study were four-fold.  The first avenue of enquiry determines the extent 
to which either a lie or a truth bias is afforded to South African speakers when the veracity of a 
statement is assessed.  This first avenue of enquiry is assessed through three refinements to the 
enquiry: (a) whether veracity assessment outcomes are biased towards assessing veracity as 
untruthful for statements provided in a non-native (second) language,  (b) whether the veracity 
assessment outcomes are biased towards assessing veracity as truthful for statements provided in 
a native (first) language, and (c) what the differences are in veracity assessment outcome 
accuracy comparing the outcomes of first and second language statements.  The second avenue 
of enquiry assesses whether the introduction of cognitive load during the recording of a verbal 
statement impacts the veracity assessment of a transcribed version of statement. The third avenue 
of enquiry assesses the extent to which the original statement veracity (truth or lie) impacts the 
veracity judgement outcome. The final avenue of enquiry aims to discern whether linguistic 
features and profiles of the transcribed statements, as assessed by LIWC2015, are better at 
detecting deception in transcribed accounts, when compared to that of human judges.  
To assess these four avenues of enquiry, six research questions and hypotheses were 
posed. 
Research Questions 
Research question 1. Is there a lie bias present when making veracity assessments of 
second language statements? This research question investigates whether second language 
statements are preferentially assessed as untruthful, regardless of the original statement veracity. 
Research question 2.  Is there a truth bias present when making veracity assessments of 
first language statements? This research question investigates whether first language statements 
are preferentially assessed as truthful, regardless of the original statement veracity. 
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Research question 3.  Is there a difference in the accuracy of veracity assessments 
observed when comparing the veracity assessment outcomes of first language statements against 
the veracity assessment outcome accuracy of second language statements? This research 
question investigates the possible extent to which language usage (reflected in this study through 
identification with the statement language as a first or second language) could influence veracity 
assessment outcomes.  
Research question 4. Does the original statement veracity impact the veracity assessment 
outcome? This research question investigates whether what is known as the veracity effect is 
influencing veracity assessment outcomes.  
Research question 5. Does an increase in cognitive load whilst providing a verbal 
statement in a second language make it easier to correctly assess the veracity of the transcribed 
statement? This research question considered the impact that cognitive load has on the veracity 
assessment of statements. 
Research question 6. Does the computer program LIWC, using the 2015 dictionary 
definitions perform better than human evaluators of statements in detecting deception in second 
language speakers?  
Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1. Reviewers are subject to a lie bias when reviewing second language 
written statements. 
Hypothesis 2. Reviewers are subject to a truth bias when reviewing first language written 
statements.  
Hypothesis 3.  There is a difference in veracity assessment outcome accuracy between 
first and second language statement assessments.  
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Hypothesis 4. The original statement veracity influences the veracity assessment 
outcome.  
Hypothesis 5. The presence of cognitive load, when providing the statement makes it 
easier for the subsequent assessment by a veracity judge to detect deception. 
Hypothesis 6. LIWC2015 will be more accurate in determining the veracity of written 
statements compared to human judges. 
The next chapter outlines the methods used in this thesis. The chapter describes the 
procedure followed in the two data gathering phases of this project.  The chapter thereafter 
reports the data analysis conducted and the results of the analysis. 
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Chapter 3 Methods 
Research Design and Setting 
This exploratory study adopted an experimental design to assess whether statement 
veracity assessment outcomes are impacted by (a) considering whether the statement was 
provided in a non-native or a native language of the statement provider, (b) placing cognitive 
load on the statement provider, and (c) the original statement veracity, being either truthful or 
not.  The study also explored whether language profiles of the English statements in this study, 
as determined by the software program LIWC 2015, could be used to assess veracity outcomes 
with higher accuracy compared to the human judges.  
In order to assess whether the statement language, identified as either a native or non-
native language of the statement provider, affects the veracity assessment outcome, three 
research questions were posed. The first of these were whether statements provided in a non-
native language are more likely to be judged as untruthful (i.e. that a lie bias is present when the 
veracity of statements provided in non-native languages are assessed).  The second was an 
assessment of the converse, i.e. assessing whether statements provided in a native language is 
more likely to be judged as truthful (i.e. a truth bias is present when judging the veracity of 
statements provided in native languages).  The third research question stepped away from the 
investigation of biases and asked whether the accuracy of veracity assessments is impacted by 
whether the statement was provided in a non-native or a native language of the statement 
provider. 
To provide a more nuanced understanding of the factors which influence veracity 
assessment outcomes, this study was expanded to include an additional research question to also 
assess whether the original provided statement’s veracity impacted the veracity judgment 
accuracy. The empirical findings of this study formulated under this research question were 
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evaluated against empirical concepts and theories such as the veracity effect and the Truth-
Default Theory. 
This study sought to replicate previous empirical findings on the impact of cognitive load 
as described in the preceding chapter. This study assessed whether cognitive load would enhance 
the ability to correct differentiate between truth and lie as suggested in previous studies.  
Finally, this research sought to determine if the software programme LIWC2015 is able 
to differentiate between truth and lie, by evaluating linguistic profiles reported in the literature 
associated with deceptive statements. The study compared the software veracity assessment 
outcomes with the assessment outcomes of human evaluators.  
Participants 
This study’s participants were recruited through both convenience and stratified random 
sampling for both phase 1 (statement generation) and phase 2 (veracity assessment).  Participants 
for both phases were expected have a good command of English (either as a first or as a second 
language) as well as a good command of either Afrikaans or isiXhosa as the alternate language.  
These three languages are the dominant local languages in the Western Cape where the study 
was conducted. 
Given the three languages selected for this study, six combinations as first and second 
language pairings were possible. The combinations are: English first language, isiXhosa second 
language (“E1X2”); English first language, Afrikaans second language (“E1A2”); isiXhosa first 
language, English second language (“X1E2”); isiXhosa first language, Afrikaans second 
language (“X1A2”); Afrikaans first language, English second language (“A1E2”) and Afrikaans 
first language, isiXhosa second language (“A2X1). The Afrikaans, isiXhosa combination of first 
and second languages, as well as English first language with isiXhosa second language were not 
well represented within the target recruitment population of the UCT campus humanities 
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students. Only three of the six language combinations were successfully recruited for the 
statement generation phase of the study as indicated below.  
Table 2  
Number of First and Second Language combinations recruited. 
First/Second language pairing (phase 1 participants) N  
English 1st language, Afrikaans 2nd language (E1A2) 26 
Afrikaans 1st language, English 2nd language (A1E2) 16 
isiXhosa 1st language, English 2nd language (X1E2) 12 
‘Other' combinations with English 8 
Total number of statement generators 62 
 
The recruitment was done through a call for participation placed on the university’s 
intranet site to which all UCT students have access to. Sixty-five interviews were scheduled 
following the time allowed for responses; three participants did not show up for the interviews 
and one candidate chose not to continue during the interview session.  This resulted in sixty-one 
(n = 61) participants’ statements recorded and carried forward to the veracity assessment stage. 
The age and gender profile for the 61 participants in the statement generation phase was 40 
female (Mage = 19.90; SDage = 1.92) and 21 males (Mage = 20.62; SDage = 2.20).  
An excellent response of five hundred and sixteen (n = 516) students were achieved for 
participation in the veracity assessment stage of the study. Statement providers (phase 1 
participants) were excluded from taking part in the veracity adjudication stage of the study. The 
age and gender profile for the 516 adjudicators was 385 females (Mage = 19.60; SDage = 2.63) 
and 126 males (Mage = 19.83; SDage = 2.32). Five participants provided non-gender specific 
responses to the gender question (Mage = 19.60; SDage = 0.55).   




Pilot studies (statement generation). Two pilot studies were performed to assess the 
practicality of the envisaged statement generation process prior to actual data collection. The 
first, conducted in a group setting with post-graduate students and faculty members in 
attendance, recommended two changes to the intended statement generation procedure. It was 
suggested that the odd numbered Likert scales provided participants with an option to respond 
neutrally to questions aimed at determining the extent to which the participant agreed or not with 
a view expressed on a topic. The original secondary task expected of the participants to induce 
cognitive load was deemed cognitively too taxing with a risk of rendering statements provided 
under cognitive load to be of no use.   
An undergraduate student from the psychology department was recruited to trial run the 
amended statement gathering procedure the following week. Two additional minor changes 
followed the second trial run: the statement duration was shortened from five to three minutes, 
and the (secondary) cognitive load task further simplified. The secondary task agreed on at this 
stage was that participants providing statements under cognitive load were to tap their finger in 
sync with a metronome during the interview process.  
Statement Generation.  The primary researcher gathered statements in individual face-
to-face interviews over a two-week period, with six one-hour sessions scheduled every day 
(60 meetings). Five additional ad-hoc interviews followed the following week, targeting first-
language Afrikaans speaking participants to achieve a balanced representation of language 
combinations in the design. Three potential participants did not show up for the interviews 
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during the three-week statement generation phase and one candidate chose not to continue during 
the interview session.  
At the start of the phase 1 interviews, the researcher outlined the purposes of the study 
and explained that participants will first be required to indicate the extent to which they agreed 
with opinions expressed on a range of contentious topics, where after two topics would be 
selected from this list. Participants would then be required to provide two statements on these 
topics in their first language, followed by two statements in their second language. The nature of 
these two statements were not provided at this stage. The researcher provided the participant an 
opportunity to clarify matters that might arise from the introduction where after participants 
completed and signed a consent form indicating their agreement to participate in the study 
(Appendix 1 and 2).  
Two bags containing six tokens each (three black, three white in one bag, three green, 
three blue in the second bag) were prepared for each day. The tokens would determine the 
sequence in which Truth/Lie statements would be provided by participants, as well as whether 
the statements were to be provided under cognitive load or not. The draws from the bags at the 
beginning of each session were done without replacement of tokens, which resulted in an even 
balance of conditions implemented as determined by the draws at the end of each day.  
Topic selection.  After consenting to take part in the study, the researcher provided 
participants with a list of twelve topics, each followed with an opinion expressed either for or 
against the topic. Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed or disagreed 
with the opinion expressed on each topic using a six-point Likert scale. (Appendix 3). The last 
question on the opinion-evaluating questionnaire was a self-reflection question, asking 
participants to indicate how honest they were in completing the ratings.  
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Once all twelve statements were responded to, the researcher established with the 
participant whether any of the topics on the list were deemed too contentions for the participant 
if they selected to continue in the next phase of the interview. If a participant indicated 
discomfort with any topic, the specific topic was removed from the list of statements available 
for selection for the individual participant. No justification for removal of topics was required. 
After eliminating topics that the participant was not prepared to engage on, the researcher 
informed the participants with additional information, not provided before rating the twelve 
statements. Participants were now informed that two topics would be selected from their 
responses and that one truthful and one untruthful statement in the participant’s first language 
will be required for the first topic, followed by another set of one truthful and one untruthful 
statement in the statement provider’s second language for the second topic. The participants were 
also informed at this stage that the statements would be audio recorded, transcribed and 
presented for review and veracity adjudication in a subsequent phase by a different group of 
participants. The researcher explained that in the subsequent phase the statement reviewers 
would be asked to assess whether the statements provided by the participant were truthful or 
deceptive and provided assurances to the participant that no identification of the statement 
providers would be possible. Having now being informed that continuing in the study would 
require participants to be untruthful in statements and that they would be audio recorded, 
participants were asked to provide consent again before continuing (Appendix 3).  
The second consent form was required as the procedure initially described leading up to 
the first consent form was incomplete. This was by design. The requirement that participants 
would be asked to provide untruthful statements was withheld initially to mitigate against the 
possibility that prior knowledge of this requirement could influence how participants assess a 
topic in anticipation of having to provide an untruthful statement on a topic. All except one 
participant agreed to continue at this stage. Once the amended consent was provided, the 
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researcher selected two topics from the statement evaluation list, giving preference to selecting 
topics where extreme scores of agreement or disagreements were indicated. 
First-Language Statements.  The statement generation procedure followed a technique 
developed by Leal, Vrij, Mann and Fisher (2010), known as the Devil’s Advocate Approach. The 
Devil’s Advocate approach starts with an opinion-eliciting question, establishing a participant’s 
opinion (either agreement or disagreement) on a topic. Once this position is established, the 
participant provides a statement in defence of the opinion expressed. The Devil’s Advocate 
question follows after this statement requiring the participant to justify an opposing view to the 
one expressed before in as convincing a manner as possible. This results in a pair of statements, 
one a truth and one a lie on the same topic by each statement provider. This process was then 
repeated for the second selected topic in the participant’s second language.  
In recognition that participants may be more settled by the time the second statement is 
required, the sequence of whether the first statement was to be truth or lie was randomised by 
drawing tokens from the first bag of six tokens. As the tokens were drawn from the bag without 
replacement, and given that each bag was prepared each day with three black and three white 
tokens, the collection of truth first verse untruth statements first were balanced over the 
statement generation phase. The participants were asked not to reveal to the researcher whether 
their first statement was to be a truth or a lie initially. 
This statement generation followed. The researcher asked the participant to express an 
opinion on the statement provided for the first of the selected topics. If the participant was 
required to tell a truth (as indicated by the token drawn), the participant would respond with the 
view expressed on the topic questionnaire; if the participant was required to be untruthful (as 
indicated by the token drawn), the participant would respond with a contrary view to the one 
expressed on the topic questionnaire.  
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Once this position has been established, the researcher asks the opinion-eliciting 
question; “What do you think led you to have that opinion,” referring to the response offered to 
the first question. Participants then justified the opinion offered (truthful or untruthful depending 
on the response to the first question) in a three minutes statement. A timer, visible to both 
researcher and participant, kept track of time during the actual statement generation.  
At the end of this first statement, the researcher continued the interview by asking the 
devil’s advocate question as follows “Playing devil’s advocate, is there anything you can say in 
favour of, (or against) the topic?” Participants had to say something in agreement of the topic at 
this stage if their first statement expressed disagreement, alternatively if their first statement was 
in agreement with the topic, the devil’s advocate question required of them to provide a 
statement disagreeing with the topic.  
Second-Language Statements. The procedure was repeated for the second topic, the only 
difference being that the statements were now required in the statement provider’s second 
language.  
Cognitive Load.  At the same time as drawing the ‘start with truth/lie’ token to establish 
the sequence in which truth/lie statements was required, participants also drew a token from a 
second bag. This token would indicate whether their statements (both first-language and second-
language) would be provided under cognitive load or not. The drawing without replacement of 
the second bag ensured that a balanced representation between statements provided under 
cognitive load and statements with no cognitive load was collected during the data collection 
phase. The secondary task required from participants selected to provide statements under 
cognitive load was to listen to and tap a finger on the desk in sync with the beat of a metronome 
whilst providing the statements. 
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Each of the 61 phase 1 participants provided four statements, one truth, one lie in the 
participant’s home language and one truth, one lie in the participant’s second language. Half of 
the participants (n = 30) provided the four statements under cognitive load, and half (n = 31) 
under no cognitive load. One participant (having drawn a cognitive load token) withdrew during 
the interview. This yielded 264 statements available for veracity adjudications in the second 
phase of data collection. 
Transcription.  The isiXhosa statement providers transcribed their own statements 
immediately post interview if sufficient time remained. All the first-language isiXhosa-speaking 
participants agreed to this. The researcher asked a native isiXhosa speaker, not involved in the 
study, to verify the transcriptions by listening to the audio recording whilst reading the 
transcriptions of each isiXhosa participant; and to complete transcriptions in the few instances 
where a participant had insufficient time after the scheduled interviews to complete the 
transcription.  The Afrikaans and English statements were transcribed by the primary researcher. 
The following meta-data was recorded with each statement, a) the statement language i.e. 
English, Afrikaans, isiXhosa; b) whether the statement language was a native (first) or non-
native (second) language of the statement provider; c) whether the response to the opinion 
eliciting question was a truth or a lie; and d) whether the provided statement was given under 
cognitive load or not. 
General procedure for phase 2.  Combining the three language combinations recruited 
with the two possible statement veracities (truth/untruth) and the presence/absence of cognitive 
load (2 possibilities) yields 12 possible combinations of attributes. The lowest number of 
statements within one of these twelve groups of attributes (Afrikaans as first language) was 5 
statements. The 244 statements were then reduced to 120 by randomly dropping statements from 
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oversampled groups to five statements within a group. This yielded a balanced representation of 
statements attribute combinations for adjudication in phase 2 as set out in table 3.  
Table 3 
Number of statements retained across all fixed effect attributes 




No Cognitive Load 5 
With Cognitive Load 5 
Truth 
No Cognitive Load 5 





No Cognitive Load 5 
With Cognitive Load 5 
Truth 
No Cognitive Load 5 




No Cognitive Load 5 
With Cognitive Load 5 
Truth 
No Cognitive Load 5 





No Cognitive Load 5 
With Cognitive Load 5 
Truth 
No Cognitive Load 5 





No Cognitive Load 5 
With Cognitive Load 5 
Truth 
No Cognitive Load 5 




No Cognitive Load 5 
With Cognitive Load 5 
Truth 
No Cognitive Load 5 
With Cognitive Load 5 
 
The one hundred Afrikaans and English statements (n = 100) were distributed into twenty 
surveys, each survey containing five statements. Each questionnaire consisted of one truthful 
first language statement, one untruthful first language statement, one truthful second language 
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statement and one untruthful second language statement. The fifth statement’s combination of 
statement attributes varied across questionnaires but when viewed across the 20 questionnaires 
(for 100 statements) all possible combinations of statement attributes were balanced. Similarly, 
four isiXhosa / English surveys were designed, each with five statements, as was the case for the 
English / Afrikaans statements.  
The adjudication of the veracity of statements was done using an online survey tool, 
SurveyMonkey (www.surveymonkey.com). Students indicated their interest in participating in 
the statement adjudication phase by responding to a call for participation via email. In response, 
the researcher sent participants the appropriate link to a survey (i.e. a link to an 
Afrikaans/English survey; or alternately to an English/isiXhosa survey). Each of the 24 surveys 
(5 statements per survey, 120 statements total) also contained a set of demographic questions. 
The demographic questions included the participants’ age, gender, home province and the 
participant’s first and second language identification. The request for demographic information 
was followed by the 5 statements. Following each individual statement, the same ten questions 
pertaining to the statement was asked. The same ten questions were asked for each of the 
statements in the questionnaire. 
The following instructions were given to reviewers “You are expected to read the five statements 
which follow and then answer the same questions per statement. It may be useful to think of 
yourself as a judge at a debating contest when you are answering the questions per statement.” 
Reviewers were deliberately not informed that they would be deciding if a statement was truthful 
or deceptive. This was a conscious decision made on the researcher’s part as to avoid the influence 
of social desirability bias i.e. to ensure that participants did not review a question in a specific way 
which they perceived to be correct.  
 
AN INVESTIGATION OF  LIE BIAS AND COGNITIVE LOAD 
 
64 
The SurveyMonkey responses were collated into a single file and combined with the 
statement attributes for subsequent analysis. Twenty-nine attributes (metadata variables) were 
recorded for each statement review.  
Data Analysis 
Both fixed effects and random effects had been identified in the data collected for 
analysis. The original design of the experiment considered three main effects, the original 
statement veracity, whether the statement was provided in a first or second language and whether 
the statement was collected under cognitive load or not. During analysis it became evident that 
understanding whether the language is being reviewed in a first or second language (of the 
veracity judge) could also be germane to this study and a fourth main effect, that of Reviewer 
first/second language was added to the original three anticipated main effects.  
Given that all fixed effects variables, as well as the veracity-adjudication outcome 
variable were categorical and dichotomous, a logistic regression GLMM model was required to 
extrapolate the experiment’s findings to the bigger population and also to assess which of the 
effects are significant in affecting the modelled outcome of the fixed effects. The most suitable 
GLMM model definition was determined through iterative comparisons of different variable 
specifications in the modelling. As the input variables are categorical in nature, logistic 
regression models were required and the criteria used to determine whether one model provides 
an improved fit or not above another was the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) criteria. The ‘better’ model in an AIC criteria comparison 
is the model with the lower AIC score. If the actual AIC scores difference between models are 
less than two, the two models are deemed to have similar ‘goodness of fit’ scores of the logistic 
regression of the models. Where appropriate and the degrees of freedom allowed for it, the 
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model outputs were compared with ANOVA assessments. Chi-square significance testing was 
conducted for differences in the states of the dichotomous variables where required. 
All statistical analysis was done using R version 3.5.3 (R Core Team, 2019). R packages 
and modules used for the GLMM modelling and the assessment of the models included lme4 
(Bates, Maechler, Bolker, Walker, 2015), psycho (Makowski, 2018), merTools (Knowles & 
Frederick, 2019), DHARMa (Hartig, 2019), data.table (Dowle & Srinivasan, 2019) and sjPlot 
(Lüdecke, 2018). Graphs were generated using module ggplot2 (Wickham, 2016). All R 
commands were run in RStudio version 1.1.463.  
Incomplete statement responses (not all questions following a statement answered), as 
well as statement reviews received from reviewers that reported either their first language or 
their second language as a language not within the group of Afrikaans, English or isiXhosa was 
excluded (n = 453) from subsequent analysis. One thousand nine hundred and seventy-two 
(n = 1,972) statements were retained for further analysis. 
The main effects considered to assess the first five research hypotheses were; whether the 
veracity of the statement was a truth or a lie; whether the statement was provided in the first or 
second language of the statement provider; whether the statement was provided under cognitive 
load or not, and whether the assessment of the provided statement was done in the first or second 
language of the statement reviewer. Table 4 on page 67, depicts the frequency distribution of the 
1,972 adjudicated statements into the sixteen possible combinations of the 4 dichotomous 
statement attributes. The number of statements across combinations down to the eight possible 
combinations of the three statement generation attributes are balanced. The inability to recruit 
sufficient second language isiXhosa participants, as well as insufficient Afrikaans second 
language combined with isiXhosa first language participants for the statement adjudication phase 
skews representation between first and second language reviews when considering the 
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reviewers’ language correspondence to statement language, the fourth dichotomous factor in the 
distribution table. 
The random effects considered in the study were (a) possible influences of individual 
statement providers on the overall fit of a GLMM model, (b) possible influences associated with 
individual statement reviewers, or (c) the subject matter (topic) of the statements.  
The age and gender distribution of statement providers were re-assessed after reducing 
the number of statements from 2,425 to 1,972. Thirty-nine (n = 39) of the original sixty-one 
statement providers remained. The 39 retained statement providers consisted of twenty-six 
females (Mage = 19.73; SDage = 1.61) and thirteen males (Mage = 21.00; SDage = 2.58). 
The age and gender evaluation of statement reviewers were re-assessed after the number 
of statements were reduced from 2,425 to 1,972. Four hundred and seventeen (n = 417) statement 
reviewers remained. The re-assessed age/gender profile for the 417 reviewers of the retained 
statements was 313 females (Mage = 19.74; SDage = 2.78) years and 99 males (Mage = 19.89; 
SDage = 2.50) with 5 participants responding non-gender specific (Mage = 19.60; SDage = 0.55). 




Table 4  
Frequency scores of statements reviewed across fixed effect variables 
Statements for adjudication (N = 1,972) 
Statement Veracity: TRUE 
n = 995 
Statement Veracity: UNTRUE 
n = 977 
First language statements 
n = 491 
Second language statements 
n = 504 
First language statements 
n = 477 
Second language statements 
n = 500 
CL: Yes 
n = 246 
CL: No 
n = 245 
CL: Yes 
n = 252 
CL: No 
n = 252 
CL: Yes 
n = 241 
CL: No 
n = 236 
CL: Yes 
n = 242 
CL: No 


































First/Second language statements: Statements provided in statement provider’s first/second language 
CL: YES – Statement provided under cognitive load;  
CL: NO – No cognitive load imposed during statement provision 
RvL1: Statement language is same as statement reviewer’s first language 
RvL2: Statement language is same as statement reviewer’s second language 
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To address the sixth research question, the accuracy of the veracity adjudication 
outcomes of human judges compared against the accuracy of the veracity judgement outcomes 
using a Natural Language Processing (NLP) programme was done using LIWC2015 (Linguistic 
Inquiry and Word Count, 2015 version). All available English statements (n = 102) were used for 
the comparison. 
Every word in each English statement was compared against LIWC2015’s dictionary of 
approximately 6,400 words, word stems and emoticons. For each statement, a language profile 
consisting of 90 output variables were created in the LIWC2015 analysis. The output variables 
consist of summary variables, a number of individual word category variables as well as grouped 
word categories variables. Analysis (comparisons against known linguistic profiles) can be done 
on grouped categories, such as “negative emotions” or on the individual constituent word 
categories within a grouped category such as “sadness” words, “anxiety” words or “anger” words 
within the “negative emotions” word category. The LIWC2015 linguistic profile of each 
statement was compared against three different linguistic profiles, one using a reality monitoring 
framework for deceptive statements as proposed by, Bond and Lee (2005) the original NP 
framework linguistic profile for deceptive statements proposed by Pennebaker and colleagues 
(2003)and against a linguistic profile created from a post-hoc analysis of the English statements 
used in this study. 
Ethical considerations. 
This research was carried out in accordance to the guidelines of the Health Professions 
Council of South Africa (HPCSA) and the University of Cape Town’s Codes for Research. The 
study received ethical approval in February 2018 (reference PSY2018-003). All participants had 
to indicate informed consent by signing a consent. All consent forms outlined the requirements 
and expectations for the particular phase.  
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Participants were assured that no participant identifying information would be made 
available within the study. All identifying data was kept confidential, all hard copy information 
(consent form, demographic forms) were kept in a secure cabinet to which only the researcher 
had access during the study. Audio recordings of participant’s statements contained no 
identifying information and were kept in password-protected folders. Participants were informed 
that they can withdraw at any stage without any penalties or repercussions. Participants were 
informed that upon withdrawal they would be provided an opportunity to instruct that the 
statements or any other information provided by them be removed from the study’s data 
repository. 
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Chapter 4 Results 
This chapter reports the statistical analysis performed of the data gathered as described in 
the previous chapter. Descriptive statistics of selected meta-data as well as the fixed and random 
effect variables are followed by summary overviews of the veracity assessment outcomes for the 
four fixed effect variables inspected individually. The interactions between the fixed effect 
variables on the veracity assessments then follow as does the impact that the three random effect 
variables have on the veracity assessment outcomes. All reported confidence intervals, whether 
indicated in tables or on figures are at 95%  
Following the descriptive analysis, the stepwise evaluation of generalised linear mixed 
models (GLMM) constructed to extrapolate the study findings to a generalized population is 
discussed. The effect of the fixed effects and the impact (effect ranges) of considering different 
random effects are evaluated step-wise to determine the generalized linear mixed modelling 
(GLMM) model with the lowest AIC scores as described in the data analysis section.  
The GLMM modelling was done using the lme4 (Bates et al. 2015) package in R. The 
R-package dHARMa (Hartig, 2019) is used to evaluate the GLMM models’ residuals to assess 
whether the GLMM model presents problems such under/over dispersion, etc. 





Figure 1, above is a histogram of the duration of the on-line questionnaires accessed.  It is 
likely that the outliers on the high side represents surveys left logged in and that eventually timed 
out or possibly another user logging in on a communal PC. The outliers to the left represent 
incomplete surveys.   
The selection of whether a reviewed statement was carried forward into the analysis 
phase was based on criteria such as completeness (all questions answered for a statement) and 
whether the self-reported first and second language identification of participants were within the 
language combinations of Afrikaans, English and isiXhosa. Ninety-nine (n = 99) respondents’ 
surveys were eliminated based on the reported language criteria, leaving four hundred and 
seventeen (n = 417) surveys.  An additional fifty-three statements were eliminated from this 
Figure 1  Reported duration of survey completion 
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collection of 2,035 statements based on whether all questions for a statement was answered. One 
thousand, nine hundred and seventy-two (N=1,972) completed statements were thus retained 
from the original number of 2,580 statements received from the 516 surveys returned by the on-
line surveying tool. 
Fixed and Main Effects 
The binary outcome variable, the four dichotomous fixed effect variables, the three 
random effect variables considered in the study are summarized in table 5. 
Table 5  
Summary of fixed and random effect variables 
 N Value ranges 
Outcome  1,972 Correct; Incorrect 
FE: Statement Veracity 1,972 Truth; Lie 
FE: Statement 1st/2nd Lang 1,972 1st Language; 2nd Language 
FE: Reviewer1st/2nd Lang 1,972 1st Language; 2nd Language 
FE: Cognitive Load 1,972 CL Present; CL Not Present 
RE: Statement Provider 1,972 ID# 1 – 39 
RE: Statement Topic 1,972 Topic # 1 – 12 
RE: Statement Reviewer 1,972 ID# 1 - 417 
Notes:  
 FE: Fixed effect variable; RE: Random Effect Variable  
 
Fixed Effects The ratio of veracity judgement outcomes (correct vs. incorrect) expressed 
as percentages of the 1,972 statements judged are depicted as a function of each of the four fixed 
effect variables individually in figure 1, page 73.  The confidence intervals reported are 95% 
confidence intervals. Only the veracity judgement outcomes grouped by original statement 
veracity shows a marked difference between correct and incorrect assessment outcomes. The 
number of correct veracity judgement outcomes, expressed as a percentage of the total number of 
assessments, in the case of a truthful statement was 73.9% CI [71.0, 76.6]. In the case where the 
statement was untruthful the number of incorrect judgements were 70.3%, CI [67.3, 73.2]. 
Statement adjudicators preferentially judged the veracity of statements as ‘truths’ regardless of 
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the actual statement veracity. The differences between truth and lie assessments (expressed as a 
percentage) were 40.6% in the case of assessing untruthful statements and 47.8% in the case of 
assessing truthful statements. The difference (expressed as a percentage) between correct and 
incorrect judgements of veracity is reported as significant χ2(1) = 383.83, p < 0.001. 
Figure 2 Fixed Effect variables, individually summarised veracity assessment outcomes 
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The other three fixed effect variables, first/second language statements, first/second 
language reviews and presence of cognitive load does not indicate marked differences between 
correct and incorrect veracity judgement outcomes when evaluated individually and independent 
of one another.  
Random Effects The three random effects considered, in this study, for possible impact 
on the accuracy of the veracity assessments were (a) statements belonging to individual 
statement providers, (b) statements assessed by individual statement reviewers, and (c) 
statements grouped by topic.  
The veracity assessment outcomes viewed as a function of individual statement provider 
(n = 39) in figure 3, page 76 shows the differences between correct and incorrect veracity 
assessment outcomes when the veracity statement outcomes are grouped by each of the 39 
statement providers retained after the filtering process described earlier.  
The veracity assessment outcomes viewed as a function of the different statement topics 
(n = 12) in figure 4, page 77 shows variation in the differences between correct and incorrect 
veracity judgements when the veracity statement outcomes are grouped by the 12 different topics 
available to statement providers. Equal representation of the topic number was not controlled for. 
Topics were selected based on the extent to which participants indicated agreement with, or 
opposition to a list of topics. Care should therefore be taken in comparing the percentage 
differences observed across topic numbers.   As an example, topic 5 (Sport inequality in South 
Africa) whilst indicating the largest difference in the proportional expression of correct vs. 
incorrect assessments (30.6% correct vs. 69.4% incorrect veracity assessments), only 36 of the 
1,972 (< 1%) statements assessed dealt with topic 5. 
 Figure 5, page 78 depicts the comparison of correct vs incorrect veracity judgement 
outcomes as a function of the individual reviewers (n = 417). The outcomes are presented as raw 
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frequency counts in this instance. Each statement veracity judge (phase 2 reviews) were asked to 
review five statements.  Where a statement judge skipped one or more of the questions posed 
after each of the five statements, the statement was removed as described earlier. This explains 
why there are a few reviewers depicted in figure 5 with less than 5 statements remaining.  The 
maximum number of 5 statements possible per reviewer represents less than 0.01% of the 1,972 
statements retained for analysis. 






Figure 3 Outcome assessments grouped by the 39 individual statement providers remaining post filtering 
Note: X-axis reports original Participant number 





Figure 4 Outcome assessments depicted as a function of individual topic 





Figure 5 Outcome assessments depicted as a function of individual reviewers 
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Generalised Linear Mixed Model 
Generalised linear mixed models (GLMM) were constructed to extrapolate the language 
related empirical findings of this study to the general population of the Western Cape. 
Model definition.  Four fixed effects and three possible random effects were identified.  
The four fixed (main) effects were all dichotomous categorical variables, and were (a) statement 
veracity (truth or lie), (b) the statement language being a first or second language of the 
statement provider, (c) whether the statement language was a first or second language of the  
statement veracity judge, and (d) whether the statement was recorded under cognitive load or 
not.  The three random effects considered were considering the impact on the outcome of 
veracity accuracy when viewed against grouping by (a) the 39 individual statement providers, (b) 
the 12 different topics of statements, or (c) the 417 different veracity judges.   
The language focussed research questions’ GLMM did not consider the cognitive load 
main effect.  Both the language focussed GLMM, as well as, the GLMM considering the 
cognitive load aspect only considered Statement Provider as a random effect in the end. This 
decision was made following an analysis of the effects that each of the three potential random 
effects under consideration could have on the intercept of the generalised linear model as 
discussed hereafter. 
Figures 6 to 8, below each depict the effect that each of the three random effect 
considerations have on the calculated intercept of a generalised linear mixed model. The GLMM 
models were computed using the fixed effects statement veracity, statement language and 
reviewer language and then considering each of the three potential random effects individually. 
The plots were generated using the R package merTools (Knowles & Frederick, 2019).  
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Considering the Statement Provider as a random effect has the biggest impact (as 
depicted by effect range, (figure 6) on the calculated intercepts of the different GLMM models.  
Considering the individual topic as a random effect also indicates some impact on the 
model outcome (intercept) albeit smaller than considering the Statement provider, as is 
evidenced by comparing the vertical axis scales of figures 6 and 7. 
 Considering the Statement reviewer groups as random effects (figure 8, below) have 
very little effect on the GLMM model outcome as evidenced by the extended vertical scale 
required to depict variation from the no effect line.    
  
Figure 6 Effect on intercept of Random Effect: Statement Provider (n = 39) 
Figure 7 Effect on intercept of Random Effect: Unique Topic (n = 12) 
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Hierarchical analysis of GLMM models in which the model with Statement Provider as a 
random effect was compared against models with either Topic or Reviewer ID as random effects 
were conducted. The results presented in tables 6 and 7 below.  The differences between the 
models using reviewers or topics as random effects compared against the statement providers 
were not significant.  After this analysis only the statement provider was considered as a random 
effect in GLMM models. 
Table 6 





Anova against Model 00 
   χ2(df) P 
 Model 00 2,291.9  2,342.2 2,273.9   
 Model 05 2,306.5  2,356.8 2,288.5 0(1) 1- 
Notes: 
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05 
Model 00: Result ~ St. Veracity * St. L1L2 * Rv. L1L2 + (1|St.Provider) 
Model 05: Result ~ St. Veracity * St. L1L2 * Rv. L1L2 + (1|Topic) 
StL1 /StL2 = First/Second language of statement provider;  
RvL1 / RvL2 = First/Second Language Review, i.e. statement language is 1st / 2nd language to reviewer) 
 
Figure 8 Effect on intercept of Random Effect: Statement Reviewer (n = 417) 
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Table 7  





Anova against Model 00 
   χ2(df) P 
 Model 00 2,291.9  2,342.2 2,273.9   
 Model 06 2,307.5  2,357.8 2,289.5 0(1) 1- 
Notes: 
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05 
Model 00: Result ~ St. Veracity * St. L1L2 * Rv. L1L2 + (1|St.Provider) 
Model 06: Result ~ St. Veracity * St. L1L2 * Rv. L1L2 + (1|St_Reviewer) 
StL1 /StL2 = First/Second language of statement provider;  
RvL1 / RvL2 = First/Second Language Review, i.e. statement language is 1st / 2nd language to reviewer) 
 
The initial model, specifying interactions between all three main effects were contrasted 
with a model where the statement veracity attribute was treated as an additive effect without any 
interaction with the two-language attribute main effects. The comparison of the two model 
outputs (Table 8) shows that the initial model (specified with full interaction between variables) 
is preferred as a summary of the model indicates the lowest AIC score (2,291.9 vs. 2,328.7). The 
difference between the two models is reported as significant χ2(3) = 42.85, p <0.001 and hence 
the full interaction model was the preferred model for this research.  
Table 8  





Anova against Model 00 
   χ2(df) P 
 Model 00 2,291.9  2,342.2 2,273.9 42.85(3) < 0.001 *** 
 Model 04 2,328.7  2,362.2 2,316.7 - - 
Notes: 
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05 
Model 00: Result ~ St. Veracity * St. L1L2 * Rv. L1L2 + (1|St.Provider) 
Model 04: Result ~ St. Veracity + St. L1L2 * Rv. L1L2 + (1|St.Provider) 
StL1 /StL2 = First/Second language of statement provider;  
RvL1 / RvL2 = First/Second Language Review, i.e. statement language is 1st / 2nd language to reviewer) 
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The coefficients and significance of effects of the GLMM model, Result ~ St. Veracity * 
St. L1L2 * Rv. L1L2 + (1|St.Provider), are tabulated in table 9, below. Eight different 
combinations (interactions) of the three dichotomous main effect variables are possible.  
Table 9  
Mixed Linear Regression Coefficient Table with Statement Veracity, Statement First/Second 
Language and Reviewer’s First/Second Language as Fixed Effects with Statement Provider as 
Random Effect 
Variable Coefficient SE z p 95% CI 
(Intercept) 0.93 0.15 6.35 < 0.001 *** [ 0.65, 1.23] 
Statement Language (2nd | 1st)  0.27 0.19 1.38 0.168 [-0.11, 0.65] 
Reviewer language (2nd | 1st) 0.11 0.23 0.50 0.681 [-0.33, 0.56]  
Statement Veracity (Lie | Truth) -1.99 0.19 -10.72 < 0.001 *** [-2.36, -1.63] 
Statement language (2nd | 1st) 
 x Reviewer language (2nd | 1st) 
-1.31 0.34 -3.89 < 0.001 *** [-1.99, -0.66] 
Statement language (2nd | 1st) 
 x Statement Veracity (Lie | Truth) 
-0.43 0.27 -1.63 0.104 [-0.95, 0.09] 
Reviewer language (2nd | 1st) 
 x Statement Veracity (Lie | Truth) 
-0.50 0.32 -1.57 0.117 [-1.13, 0.12] 
Statement Language (2nd | 1st) 
 x Reviewer language (2nd | 1st) 
 x Statement Veracity (Lie | Truth) 
2.24 0.43 5.19 < 0.001 *** [ 1.40, 3.09] 
Notes: *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05 
The model's intercept is at 0.93 (SE = 0.15, CI [0.65, 1.23]). Three significant effects are 
indicated within the GLMM model: the main effect of statement veracity (β = -1.99, SE = 0.19, 
CI [-2.36, -1.63], z = -10.72, p < .001), the two-way interaction between second language 
statements reviewed in a second language (β = -1.31, SE = 0.34, CI [-1.99, -0.66], z = -3.89, p < 
.001) as well as the three way interaction between all three fixed effects (β = 2.24, SE = 0.43, CI 
[1.40, 3.09], z = 5.19, p < .001). The remaining variables and interactions in the model were not 
indicated as significant. 
Model validation.  Hartig (2019) asserts that the use of ‘standard’ residual plot 
algorithms for GLMM models may indicate all manner of problems including non-normality, 
heteroscedasticity even in instances where a model is correctly specified. Hartig developed the R 
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module DHARMa (Hartig, 2019) to enable residual diagnostics of hierarchical multi-level/mixed 
regression models. The diagnostic output is generated by simulating models using a GLMM 
model definition to create interpretable scaled residuals (Hartig, 2019). Once outputs have been 
simulated, the DHARMa package provides utilities to plot and test for model misspecification 
that could result in problems such under/over dispersion, etc.  
One thousand simulations using the selected GLMM model, being Result ~ Statement 
Veracity * Statement First/Second Language * Reviewer First/Second language + (1| 
Participant_ID) were computed. To assess whether problems are present in the model 
specification the user compares plots of the simulated interquartile ranges with the expected 
interquartile ranges. In the case where the model specification is valid, the QQ-plot of the 
(simulated) residuals will plot close to the “observed” value = “expected” value on a scatterplot. 
In the right-hand graph of Figure 9, the interquartile ranges of the three fixed effects and 
the interactions between the fixed effects are depicted as boxplots. The observation that the 0.25 
to 0.75 interquartile ranges plots close to the ranges corresponding to the standardized residual 
values, combined with a QQ plot that shows almost no deviation of the simulated residuals from 
the ideal line is interpreted as indicating an appropriate model specification. 
Figure 9 DHARMa scaled residuals plot 
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The Effect of Statement and Review language interaction on veracity judgment.  
A tendency amongst veracity judges to evaluate the veracity of statements as truthful, 
regardless of the original statement veracity being truth or lie has been indicated in the 
discussion of figure 2, a figure depicting the outcomes of veracity judgment when viewed across 
the four main effects individually, on page 73.  The GLMM model discussed in the previous 
section showed a significant interaction between second language statements reviewed in a 
second language (β = -1.31, SE = 0.34, CI [-1.99, -0.66], z = -3.89, p < .001) on the modelled 
veracity outcome.  Figure 6, on page 87 depicts the veracity assessment outcomes as functions of 
the interaction between first and second language reviews and first and second language 
statements.  
The percentage of correct veracity judgements for first language statements adjudicated 
in a first language (“first language reviews”) was 51.2% CI [47.2, 55.3] and for first language 
statements adjudicated in a second language (“second language reviews”) 54.0% CI [48.7, 59.2].   
The differences in the accuracy of veracity judgement outcomes for first language 
statements reviewed in a first language compared to first language statements reviewed in a 
second language is only 2.8%.  This difference is not reported as significant χ2(1) = 0.58, 
p > 0.05.  
However, the percentage of correct veracity judgements for second language statements 
adjudicated in a first language (“first language reviews”) was 49.1% CI [45.2, 53.1] and for 
second language statements adjudicated in a second language (“second language reviews”) 
56.2% CI [50.9%, 61.3%]. The differences in the accuracy of veracity judgement outcomes for 
second language statements reviewed in a first language compared to second language 
statements reviewed in a second language is 7.1% and is reported as significant, χ2(1) = 4.31, p < 
0.05.  
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An overall significance test between first and second language reviews, collapsed across 
first and second language statements (i.e. not considering whether the statement was provided by 
a first or second language statement provider) is also reported as significant χ2(1) = 4.26, 
p  < 0.05.   
An overall significance test between first and second language statements, collapsed 
across first and second language reviews (i.e. not considering whether the statement was 
Figure 10 Veracity assessment outcome ratios against language attributes 
AN INVESTIGATION OF  LIE BIAS AND COGNITIVE LOAD 
 
87 
reviewed by a first or second language reviewer) does not report as significant; χ2(1) = 0.05 p = 
0.832 (>0.10). 
Thus, we can conclude that in this study, the consideration whether the reviewer is 
reviewing in the reviewer’s native language or not has a bigger impact on the accuracy of the 
veracity assessment outcome than whether the language was provided by a first or second 
language statement provider. 
Truth Default and the Veracity effect  
The analysis is expanded to consider the impact of the original statement veracity on the 
veracity judgement outcome together with the four different combinations of statement and 
reviewer language. The outcomes of correct and incorrect adjudications for the eight possible 
combinations of the three dichotomous fixed effect variables are depicted in figure 11 on the 
following page. 
The introduction of statement veracity into the grouping of language attributes to assess 
veracity adjudication outcomes yields non overlapping 95% confidence intervals in seven of the 
eight possible combinations of the three dichotomous fixed effect variables depicted. The only 
combination of the three dichotomous fixed effect variables that indicate overlapping confidence 
intervals is the second language review of second language statements combined with an 
untruthful (lie) statement. The statements in this group was assessed correctly 46.2%, CI [38.2, 
54.3] and assessed incorrectly 53.8%, CI [45.7, 61.8].  
Truth Default.  All eight possible combinations (interactions) of the three dichotomous 
variables yielded more ‘true’ veracity judgements than ‘untrue’, i.e. more truthful statements 
were correctly judged ‘true’ than incorrectly as ‘lies’, and more ‘untrue’ statements were 
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incorrectly judged as ‘true’ than correctly judged as lies. This is in line with the original 
observations made in figure 2, page 73.   
Figure 11 Veracity assessment outcomes for interacting fixed effect variables 
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 The veracity adjudication of second language statements combined with second 
language reviews, for both ‘truth’ and ‘untruth’ statement veracities, indicate the smallest 
difference between correct and incorrect assessments. (7.6% for statement veracities a lie, 27.6 
% for statement veracities being truths). This is a marked difference compared to other language 
combinations indicated in table 10, below.  
Table 10  











χ2  df p 
Untrue 
St_L1 
Rv_L1 -43.6 % 
-1.8% 0.0122 1  0.912 
Rv_L2 -45.4 % 
St_L2 
Rv_L1 -50.8 % 
43.2% 22.503  1 
 < 0.001 *** 
 Rv_L2 -7.6 % 
True 
St_L1 
Rv_L1 46.0 % 
14.2% 3.6855  1  0.054 
Rv_L2 62.2 % 
St_L2 
Rv_L1 54.8 % 
-27.2% 10.603  1 0.0011 ** 
Rv_L2 27.6 % 
Notes: *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05 
St 1st/St 2nd: First or second language statements;  
Rv 1st/Rv 2nd statements adjudicated in a first or second language; 
Δ Correct, Incorrect: % difference between correct and incorrect veracity judgements 
ΔRvL2- ΔRvL1 Difference in outcome difference (Reviewer Language) 
Only the adjudication of second language statements yielded significant differences 
between correct and incorrect veracity judgments (43.2% and -27,2%). Second language reviews 
of second language statements do report higher number of assessments being judged as lies, 
evidenced by the reduction of the differences between correctly and incorrectly assessed 
statements. Thus, whilst the interaction of second language reviews of second language 
statements do yield proportionally higher judgements of ‘lie’ than ‘truth’ compared to other 
combinations, a greater number of statements are still, albeit marginally in this category assessed 
as truths for this combination of attributes.    
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Veracity Effect.  The Veracity effect holds that truthful statements are more likely to be 
assessed correctly as truths than deceptive statements are likely to be correctly assessed as lies 
(Levine et al., 1999). When considering the overall dataset, there is a significant correlation 
between the veracity judgment outcome and the original statement veracity of χ2(1) = 383.83; p 
< 0.001.  This correlation between veracity judgment outcome and original statement veracity is 
depicted below and is an extract of the original descriptive plot of figure 2 on page 73.  Figure 
12, below, indicates that 73.9% [71.0, 76.1] of the truthful statements were correctly assessed as 
truths, whilst 70.3% [67.3, 73.2] of the untruthful statements were incorrectly assessed as truths.  
This supports the “Veracity Effect” framework of deceptive communication that holds 
that truthful statements are more likely to be assessed correctly as truths than deceptive 
statements are likely to be correctly assessed as lies.   
Figure 12 Impact of Original Statement Veracity 




Significance testing of correlation between reviewer’s veracity assessments against the 
2 x 2 language interactions for statements grouped overall by truth and lie statement veracities 
was done to assess the presence of bias. For the ‘truth’ statements, a chi-square test of the 
veracity judgment outcome against the four language combinations indicated χ2(3) = 17.92, p < 
0.001 whilst the chi-square of ‘lie’ statements’ veracity judgment outcome against the four 
language combinations indicated χ2(3) = 25.741; p < 0.001. Both correlations are reported as 
significant.  
To better understand the contribution from each of the possible language interactions to 
the significant correlations, an analysis of the contributions of the Pearson residuals to the chi-
square test was performed. The different interactions’ contributions to the overall chi-square 
calculation are expressed as percentage contributions for the truth and lie statement groups and 
are depicted in Table 11 (truthful statements) and Table 12 (untruthful statements). 
Table 11  
Proportional contribution of Pearson residuals to χ2 significance for truthful statements 
  StL1 x RvL1 StL1 x RvL2 StL2 x RvL1 StL2 x RvL2 
Reviewer Judgement: LIE 0.5% 8.1% 20.2% 45.1% 
Reviewer Judgement: TRUE 0.2% 2.9% 7.1% 16.0% 
Notes: 
StL1 /StL2 = First/Second language of statement provider 
RvL1 / RvL2 = First/Second Language Review (Statement language is first / second language to reviewer) 




Table 12  
Proportional contribution of Pearson residuals to χ2 significance for untruthful statements 
  StL1 x RvL1 StL1 x RvL2 StL2 x RvL1 StL2 x RvL2 
Reviewer Judgement: LIE 0.8% 1.3% 11.7% 56.4% 
Reviewer Judgement: TRUE 0.3% 0.6% 5.0% 23.8% 
Notes: 
StL1 /StL2 = First/Second language of statement provider 
RvL1 / RvL2 = First/Second Language Review (Statement language is first / second language to reviewer) 
Inspection of tables 11 and 12 indicate that the biggest contributions to the significant 
chi-square correlations reported, for both instances of truth and lie grouped statements are from 
the combination of second language statements and second language reviews. Not much of the 
contribution to the outcome is attributed to first language contributions. 
Second language Statements and lie bias.  To indicate a lie bias is present when 
statement judges review second language statements, it needs to be shown that veracity judges 
are more likely to judges second language statements as being untruthful regardless of the 
original statement veracity.  The results of the study do not support the original (overall) 
hypotheses that a lie bias is extended to second language statements as evidenced by Figure 11 
on page 88. Truthful second language statements, regardless whether reviewed in a first or 
second language is overall correctly assessed as truths and untrue second languages statements is 
overall incorrectly assessed as truths. 
 However, in the case of second language statements (the statement language is a second 
language of the statement provider), reviewed by a second language veracity judge (the 
statement language is a second language to the veracity judge) the analysis of the contributions 
of the language combinations to the significance of veracity assessment outcomes, as presented 
in tables 11 and 12 above, do support a lie bias in this one category. The proportional 
contribution of second language statements reviewed by second language veracity judges for 
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originally untruthful statements are indicated 32.8% higher for correct judgment of the statement 
as a lie, and 29.1% for incorrectly assessed truthful statements as lies. 
So, whilst an overall lie bias towards second language statements is not demonstrated, in 
the specific case of second language statements reviewed by a second language judge a lie bias 
can be inferred. 
First Language Statements and Truth Bias It was already established that in this study 
the veracity judging of statements, regardless of language attributes is more likely to be assessed 
as truths than lies.  Figures 2, 10 and 11 presented earlier supports this conclusion. A truth bias 
implies that lie statements will likely be incorrectly assessed as truths, whilst truth statements 
will preferentially be correctly assessed as truths.    
Overall, this study does indicate a preferential judging of statements as truths.  However, 
inspection of tables 11 and 12 indicates that grouping first language statements together to assess 
contributions to the overall outcome significance testing are very small, specifically for the 
correlation between statements assessed as truths (0.3%, 0.6%, 0. 2% and 2.9%). From this 
observation it is concluded that the outcomes of the study are preferentially a support of the 
veracity effect rather than evidence of a truth bias towards first language statement reviews. 
Cognitive Load and Veracity Judgement  
In order to determine whether cognitive load affected the accuracy of veracity judgments, 
the GLMM model used was updated to include the dichotomous variable indicating the presence 
or absence of cognitive load. 
Table 13, below summarises the hierarchical analysis between the GLMM model used to 
assess research question one (Model RQ1) and a model where the fixed effect variable indicating 
the presence of cognitive load is also considered in addition to the fixed effect variables 
considered in the first research question (Model RQ5). The comparison does not indicate 
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significant difference in the goodness of fit indicators as represented by the AIC scores: 2,291 
(no cognitive load considered) and 2,302 (considering the presence of cognitive load). 
Table 13 
AIC values and hierarchical comparisons to assess presence of cognitive load 
 
AIC BIC deviance 
Anova against no Cognitive Load 
 χ2(df) p 
Model RQ5 2,302.4 2,397.4 2.268.4 5.45 (8)  0.707 
Model RQ1 2,291.9 2,342.2 2,273.9 - - 
Notes: 
Model RQ1: Result ~ St. Veracity * St. L1L2 * Rv. L1L2 + (1|St.Provider) 
Model RQ5: Result ~ St. Veracity + St. L1L2 * Rv. L1L2 * St_CogLoad + (1|St.Provider) 
StL1 /StL2 = Statement in first/second language of statement provider;  
RvL1 / RvL2 = Statement is reviewed in a first/second language of adjudicator;  
St_CogLoad = Indicator whether cognitive load was present or not when statement was provided 
 
The summary of the updated GLMM model’s coefficients follows in Table 12 on the next 
page. Previously, as tabulated in Table 9, three significant effects were indicated within the 
original GLMM model used to assess research question one: the effect of statement veracity (β = 
-1.99, SE = 0.19, CI [-2.36, -1.63], z = -10.72, p < .001), the two-way interaction between second 
language statements reviewed in a second language (β = -1.31, SE = 0.34, CI [-1.99, -0.66], z = -
3.89, p < .001) as well as the three way interaction between all three fixed effects (β = 2.24, SE = 
0.43, CI [1.40, 3.09], z = 5.19, p < .001).  In the updated GLMM model, when considering the 
presence of cognitive load as well, four significant effects are indicated: the effect of statement 
veracity (β = -2.20, SE = 0.27, CI [-2.74, -1.68], z = -8.15, p < .001), the two-way interaction 
between second language statements reviewed in a second language (β = -0.93, SE = 0.48, CI [-
1.88, 0.00], z = -1.93, p < .05), the three way interaction between the three fixed effects without 
cognitive load (β = 1.69, SE = 0.60, CI [0/51, 2.88], z = 2.81, p < .01); as well as the interaction 
between statement first/second language and cognitive load (β = 0.78, SE = 0.39, CI [0.01, 1.54], 
z = 2.00, p < .05).  
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Table 14  
Mixed Linear Regression Coefficient Table with Statement Veracity, Statement First/Second 
Language, Reviewer’s First/Second Language and presence of Cognitive Load as Fixed Effects 
with Statement Provider as Random Effect 
Variable Coefficient SE z p 95% CI 
(Intercept) 1.13 0.21 5.30 < 0.001 *** [ 0.72, 1.56] 
Statement Language (2nd | 1st)  -0.14 0.28 -0.51 0.613 [-0.70, 0.41] 
Reviewer language (2nd | 1st) 0.02 0.33 0.07 0.941 [-0.62, 0.69] 
Statement Veracity (Lie | Truth) -2.20 0.27 -8.15 < 0.001 *** [-2.74, -1.68] 
Cognitive Load (Yes| No) -0.38 0.30 -1.28 0.200 [-0.96, 0.20] 
Statement language (2nd | 1st) 
 x Reviewer language (2nd | 1st) 
-0.93 0.48 -1.93 0.053 [-1.88, 0.00] 
Statement language (2nd | 1st) 
 x Statement Veracity (Lie | Truth) 
-0.02 0.38 -0.06 0.955 [-0.76, 0.72] 
Reviewer language (2nd | 1st) 
 x Statement Veracity (Lie | Truth) 
-0.23 0.44 -0.53 0.598 [-1.12, 0.63] 
Statement language (2nd | 1st) 
 x Cognitive Load (Yes| No) 
0.78 0.39 2.00 0.046 * [0.01, 1.54] 
Reviewer language (2nd | 1st) 
 x Cognitive Load (Yes| No) 
0.17 0.46 0.38 0.073 [-0.72, 1.07] 
Statement Veracity (Lie| Truth) 
 x Cognitive Load (Yes| No) 
0.40 0.37 1.09 0.275 [-0.32, 1.13] 
Statement Language (2nd | 1st) 
 x Reviewer language (2nd | 1st) 
 x Statement Veracity (Lie | Truth) 
1.69 0.60 2.81 0.005 ** [ 0.51, 2.88] 
Statement Language (2nd | 1st) 
 x Reviewer language (2nd | 1st) 
 x Cognitive Load (Yes| No] 
-0.75 0.66 -1.14 0.252 [-2.03, 0.54] 
Statement Language (2nd | 1st) 
 x Statement Veracity (Lie | Truth) 
 x Cognitive Load (Yes| No] 
-0.80 0.53 -1.50 0.132 [-1.84, 0.24] 
Reviewer Language (2nd | 1st) 
 x Statement Veracity (Lie | Truth) 
 x Cognitive Load (Yes| No] 
-0.55 0.64 -0.86 0.391 [-1.81, 0.70] 
Statement Language (2nd | 1st) 
 x Reviewer language (2nd | 1st) 
 x Statement Veracity (Lie | Truth) 
 x Cognitive Load (Yes| No] 
1.10 0.86 1.28 0.206 [-0.59, 2.80] 
Note: *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05 
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Table 14, above, shows that whilst the same effects were reported as the more significant 
compared to the other effects in the updated GLMM model, overall the significances were 
weaker once the cognitive load variable is introduced in the model. The interaction between 
statement language and the presence of cognitive load was additionally indicated as weakly 
significant, p < 0.05. Figure 12 depicts the extent to which the presence of cognitive load impacts 
the veracity adjudication of statements 
Figure 13 The Effect of Cognitive Load on the veracity adjudication of statements 

















χ2 df p 
Truth 
St 1st  
Rv 1st  
Yes 47.2% 
2.6% 0.02 1 0.893 
No 44.6% 
Rv 2nd  
Yes 65.8% 
6.6% 0.14 1 0.750 
No 59.2% 
St 2nd  
Rv 1st  
Yes 55.8% 
27,6% 0.00 1 0.975 
No 28.2% 
Rv 2nd  
Yes 28.2% 
1.2% 0.00 1 1.000 
No 27.0% 
Untruth 
St 1st  
Rv 1st  
Yes 9.4% 
43.2% 2.76 1 0.096 
No -33.8% 
Rv 2nd  
Yes -42.6% 
5.8% 0.73 1 0.786 
No -48.4% 
St 2nd  
Rv 1st  
Yes -57.8% 
14.6% 2.06 1 0.150 
No -43.2% 
Rv 2nd  
Yes -2.6% 
9.8% 0.22 1 0.640 
No -12.4% 
Notes: *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05 
St 1st/St 2nd: First or second language statements;  
Rv 1st/Rv 2nd statements adjudicated in a first or second language; 
CLY: Statement provided under cognitive load; 
CLN: No secondary task (cognitive load) during statement provision.  
Δ Correct, Incorrect: % difference between correct and incorrect veracity judgements 
ΔCL (Δ): Difference in difference of outcomes due to cognitive load 
 
Figure 13, and Table 15, above summarises the differences observed between the 
statement veracity adjudication and the presence or absence of cognitive load. Introducing 
cognitive load when true statements are provided does not have a big impact on the veracity 
adjudication of statements. The difference (expressed as percentage) between truth statements 
with cognitive load present against the condition with no cognitive load present ranges from 
0.6% to 3.3%. However, in the case of untrue statements (attempts to deceive) the correct 
outcomes range from -7.3% to 9.4%. The presence of cognitive load does improve the number of 
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correct judgements of veracity of statements for first language reviews of first language 
statements (9.4%) and second language review of second language statements (5.4%). The 
presence of cognitive load does influence the percentage of correct veracity adjudication but 
results in opposing movements in outcomes for first and second language statements. None of 
the differences between correct and incorrect adjudications are reported as significant, hence it is 
concluded that in this study, the presence of cognitive load during statement generation did not 
have any significant impact on the veracity adjudication outcome. 
NLP (LIWC2015) vs Human Evaluators 
One hundred and two (n = 102) English statements, 51 true (n = 51) and 51 untrue (n = 
51) were processed through LIWC2015 and the resultant linguistic profiles compared against 
published deceptive linguistic frameworks.  The comparisons were made to assess whether NLP 
assessments of the transcribed English statements generated in this study were more accurate 
than with the human veracity judges. 
Word Count  One of the observations made in the existing literature is that a word count 
difference (statement length difference) is often observed between truthful and deceptive 
statements.  There were no significant differences in the word count of statements comparing 
truthful and untruthful statements in this study. The word count descriptive statistics for the 
English statements are presented in Table 16, below. 
Table 16  
Word Count Comparison of truthful vs untruthful English statements 
Veracity n mean SD χ2 Df p 
Cohen's d 
d CI 
Truth 51 359.94 98.20 
83 84 >0.05 0.28 [-0.11, 0.68] 
Untruth 51 357.53 88.86 
Note: 
n: the number of statements for each veracity category  
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As participants were required to provide statements limited to a three-minute duration 
whether telling truth or untruth, the design of this study potentially excluded using this as an 
indicative criterion assisting with categorising statements as truth or lie as requiring a three-
minute statement in each case ‘forces’ statements to be similar in length.  
Summary Variables and Word Categories Appendix 4 contains several figures 
showing the complete summary of all LIWC2015 summary variables and word categories 
provided for in LIWC2015 except for punctuation categories. Punctuation categories were 
excluded from analysis as the analyses were done on transcribed statements and not originally 
written statements where the use of punctuation from individual statement providers could be 
beneficial.  
Published Linguistic Profiles associated with Deception Comparisons of the linguistic 
profile differences between truthful (n = 51) and untruthful (n = 51) statements using a Natural 
Language Processing (NLP) deceptive statement linguistic profile is presented in Table 17 on 
page 100 and depicted in Figure 14 on page 101. A similar comparison between truthful (n = 51) 
and untruthful (n = 51) statements using a Reality Monitoring deceptive statement linguistic 
profile is presented in Table 19 on page 102 and graphically depicted in Figure 15, page 103. 
For both linguistic frameworks (Reality Monitoring and Natural Language Processing) 
generalised linear models (GLM) were defined and the significance of the logistics regression 
coefficients assessed to determine whether the study’s observations can be extrapolated 
successfully to that of a general population. The Natural Language Processing framework, which 
is based off of Pennebaker et al., (2003) understanding of what a deceptive statement profile will 
consist of  coefficient table is reported in table 18, page 101 and the Reality Monitoring 
processing framework’s GLM in table 20, page 103.  
.
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Table 17  
Word category comparisons within a Natural Processing framework 
NLP framework Example words 




M SD χ2 df p d CI 
First person singular I, me, my 1.85 1.37 2.19 1.57 90.67 81 >0.05 0.23 [-0.16, 0.62] 
Third person he, she, them 2.78 2.13 3.17 2.59 98.00 89 >0.05 0.16 [-0.22, 0.56] 
Negative emotions hate, enemy 1.63 1.38 1.39 1.30 84.50 82 >0.05 -0.18 [-0.57, 0.21] 
Negate no. not. never 2.65 1.63 2.51 1.22 88.00 87 >0.05 -0.10 [-0.50, 0.29] 
Differ hasn't, but, else 4.71 1.79 4.60 1.59 88.67 88 >0.05 -0.06 [-0.46, 0.33] 
Motion words go, walk, run 1.95 1.22 1.73 0.94 84.67 84 >0.05 -0.21 [-0.60, 0.19] 
Notes           
The original NP framework used a word category "Exclusive words" that is no longer in the 2015 dictionary. Replaced with "Negations" and "differentiations" 
The third person word category was computed from the sum of the third person singular and third person plural categories of the LIWC 2015 dictionary 
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Table 18  
Linear Regression Coefficient Table for with NLP word categories as Fixed Effects 
Word category variables Coefficient SE z p 95% CI 
(Intercept) 0.406 0.84 0.47 > .1 [-1.26, 2.09] 
I 0.175 0.14 1.21 > .1 [-0.11, 0.47] 
Third person 0.133 0.09 1.44 > .1 [-0.05, 0.32]  
Negate -0.161 0.19 -0.83 > .1 [-0.55, 0.22] 
negemo -0.192 0.16 -1.18 > .1 [-0.53, 0.12] 
Differ 0.007 0.14 0.05 > .1 [0.28,0.29] 
motion -0.260 0.20 -1.32 > .1 [0.66, 0.12] 
Notes: *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05 
 
The Natural Language Processing framework logistic regression model using this study’s 
observations of the variables associated with the NLP framework was not significant and was not 
considered any further. 
 
 
Figure 14. Linguistic Profile within a Natural Language Processing Framework 




Table 19  
Word Category comparisons within a Reality Monitoring framework 
Reality Monitoring framework 
Word Categories 
Example words 
Untruthful Truthful Significance of difference Cohen's d 
M SD M SD χ2 df p d CI 
Perceptual Processes see, feel, hear 1.50 1.18 1.50 0.94 82.42 77 >0.05 0.0059 [-0.3869, 0.3987] 
Relativity (spatial) go, down, over 9.83 3.30 11.36 2.79 100.00 94 >0.05 0.4988 [ 0.0999, 0.8978] 
Time Orientations (Temporal) today, is, now 17.46 3.56 17.79 2.56 97.33 91 >0.05 0.1070 [-0.2862, 0.5001] 
Affective happy, love, hate 3.99 1.82 3.96 1.61 86.00 86 >0.05 -0.2160 [0.4144, 0.3713] 
Cognitive Processes think, perhaps 16.49 3.32 16.47 1.01 91.33 92 >0.05 -0.0068 [-0.3997, 0.3861] 
Note 
The Time Orientation word category was computed from the sum of the 'past focus', 'present focus' and 'future focus' word categories of the LIWC2015 dictionary. 
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Table 20  
Linear Regression Coefficient Table for Reality Monitoring word categories as fixed effects. 
Word category variables Coefficient SE z p CI 
(Intercept) -5.13 2.531 -2.027 < .05  [-10.337, -0.331] 
affect  0.154 0.139 1.104 > .1 [-0.117, 0.435] 
Cognitive Processing 0.073 0.075 0.972 > .1 [-0.072, 0.225]  
Perception) -0.039 0.197 -1.098 > .1 [-0.433, 0.348] 
Time Orientation 0.059 0.069 0.847 > .1 [-0.076, 0.199] 
Relative 0.219 0.081 2.689 < .01 [0.066, 0.389] 
Notes: *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05 
The Reality Monitoring framework for deceptive language detection’s model (GLM) 
using the observations of this study’s intercept is -5.13 (SE = 2.53, CI [-10.34, -0.33]) Within the 
model, only the effect of the spatial word category (“relativ”) is significant (β = 0.22, SE = 0.08, 
CI [0.07, 0.39], z = 2.69, p < .01). The effect can be considered as “small” 
In order to assess the effectiveness of the model to correctly assess the veracity 
judgement outcome of the statements analysed by LIWC2015 using the Reality monitoring 
 
Figure 15 Linguistic Profile of deceptive communication within a Reality Monitoring 
Framework 
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framework, models were fitted using 71 randomly selected statements (70% of 102 statements) 
and the fitted model used every time to predict the outcome of the remaining 31 statements (30% 
of 102 statements) . This was repeated 1,000 times, in a simulation run where the selection of the 
training of model fitting statements randomly varied between each run. The outcome of the 1,000 
simulations conducted is depicted in Figure 16. 
 
Post-hoc Analysis 
Each statement in the phase 2 questionnaires asked, in addition to opining on whether the 
statement under review is truthful or not, a number of questions pertaining to the perception of 
characteristics or attributes the reviewer has formed of the statement provider and the quality of 
the statement. The descriptive results of these ancillary questions were:  
Figure 16 Reality Monitoring deceptive language framework simulation 
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Language Proficiency. Figure 17 depicts the perceptions of the statement judges of the 
language proficiency of the speaker after reviewing each statement, expressed as a view of 
whether the statement language was a native or non-native language of the statement provider.   
For those speakers, judged to be non-native speakers, the assessment of whether the 
statement was a truth, or a lie was no different to that of a chance outcome. In the case of 
deceptive statements (‘lies’) 52.2% [43.4%; 60.9%] of the statements were incorrectly assessed 
as truths against 47.8% [39.1%; 56.6%], a difference of only 4.4% (Δ = 4.4%).  In the case of 
truthful statements, the difference between correct and incorrect veracity judgment outcomes is 
negligible (Δ=0.8%).  For both truthful and deceptive statements, the confidence intervals 
Figure 17 Phase 2 Participant Responses: Language Proficiency of Speaker 
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associated with the outcome of the veracity assessment outcomes overlap substantially. In 
keeping with the observations in figure 2, page 73, for the other three categories of language 
proficiency perception, statements are preferentially assessed as truths regardless of whether the 
original statement was truthful or deceptive.  Figure 15, page 105 shows that the less proficient 
the statement judge perceived the speaker to be, the more chance-like the accuracy of the 
outcomes are, and the more proficient the judge perceived the speaker to be the more likely the 
judge would assess the veracity of the statement as truthful, regardless of the original statement 
veracity.  
Statement Clarity. Figure 18, page 107 depicts the experience of the reviewers in 
judging each statement, expressed as a view of how easy it was to follow the argument(s) put 
forward by the speaker.  
A similar trend than observed in figure 15, presents in figure 16 as well.  The easier the 
statement was to follow, the more likely the judges evaluated the statements as truthful, 
regardless of the original statement veracity. For the statements assessed as not easy to follow, in 
the case of originally deceptive statements there is no differences between correct and incorrect 
assessments (Δ=0).  There is, however, some difference indicated between the correct/incorrect 
assessments of originally truthful statements for statements difficult to follow (Δ=10.2%) 
  
AN INVESTIGATION OF  LIE BIAS AND COGNITIVE LOAD 
 
107 
Statement Repetition. Figure 19 page 108 depicts the opinions of the statement judges 
in judging the amount of repetition in each statement.   
It shows judges perceived most of the statements as being repetitive in varying degrees. 
Only 138 of the total 1,972 statements assessed were characterised as having no repetition 
(“None”).  Six hundred and forty-one (n = 641) statements were assessed as highly repetitive 
(“lots”), seven hundred and eighty-one (n = 781) as statements with some repetition and four 
hundred and twenty-two (n = 422) with little repetition. Evaluating the percentage difference 
between correct and incorrect veracity judgements in figure 17 for the different perceptions on 
repetition indicates a similar observation in figures 14 and 15, i.e. the ‘better’ a statement is 
received (as expressed through the amount of repetition in the view of the judge in this instance) 
Figure 18 Phase 2 Participant Responses: How easy was the statement to follow? 
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the more likely the veracity would be judged as truthful regardless of the original statement 
veracity. This observation of preferentially judging statements to be truthful also holds for 
statements assessed as being very repetitive (“lots of repetition”) 
 
 
Figure 19 Phase 2 Participant Responses: How much repetition occurred in Statement? 
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How informed was the speaker? Figure 20, page 109 depicts the opinions formed by 
the veracity judges on how informed the speakers were about a topic.  
In instances where the veracity judge assessed the speaker as ill-informed, the accuracy 
of the veracity assessments suffered. In the case of truthful statements 57% [47.4; 66.3] of 
statements were incorrectly assessed as lies and in the case of deceptive statements 53.6% [45.7; 
61.4] was incorrectly assessed as truths.  This is the first instance where a category of statements 
were preferentially judged as untruths,  Nevertheless, the overall trend observed in the earlier 
judges’ response graphs are also present in this view with a preferentially increase in judging 
statements to be true regardless of original statement veracity as judges perceived speakers more 
Figure 20 Phase 2 Participant Responses: How Informed was the speaker on the topic? 
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positively, in this case to be better informed (with the exception as indicated of views of ill-
informed responses of originally truthful statements). 
Agreement with the speaker? Figure 21, page 110 depicts the extent to which a veracity 
judge agreed with the opinion of the speaker providing a statement.  
There is little differentiation in the preference to assess the veracity as truthful regardless 
of original statement veracity across the 4 categories when expressed as a percentage between 
whether the original statement veracity was truthful or deceptive, e.g. 90.8% [84.9, 95.0] in the 
case of deceptive statements assessed incorrectly as truths, vs. 89.3%  [84.4; 93.1] in the case of 
Figure 21 Phase 2 Participant Responses: To what extent do you agree with the speaker? 
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truthful statements correctly assessed as truths (Δ% = 1.5%).  The biggest difference is observed 
for the category ‘Somewhat agree’ with (Δ% = 2.7%.)  
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Chapter 5 Discussion 
This chapter discusses the results of this study within the research frameworks and 
literature reported on in preceding chapters.  It starts with a brief summary of the overall findings 
and then goes into a more in-depth discussion of the study’s findings. 
An overall lie bias towards statements provided in a second language of the statement 
provider could not empirically be demonstrated in this study. However, a further subset of the 
second language statements into whether the assessment was done by a first or second language 
statement veracity judge hinted at a lie bias.  Results of the study were consistent with extant 
literature in terms of an overall truth bias, but the results were more marginal when restricting 
this assessment to the first language statements as required by the second research hypothesis.  
The assessment of the overall dataset supports the premise behind the Veracity Effect framework 
that holds that truthful statements are more likely to be assessed correctly as truths than 
deceptive statements are likely to be correctly assessed as lies as suggested by Levine and 
colleagues (1999).   
In contrast to what was expected the influence of cognitive load was not significant when 
assessed on the overall data set. However, when considering the smaller subset of the data 
representing cognitive load placed on second language statement providers an observable effect 
is noticeable.  Finally, this study found that the software programme LIWC2015 marginally 
outperformed human evaluators in making veracity assessments.  
This study found, in keeping with studies reported in the literature, that the veracity 
assessment outcomes overall was still close to a chance level outcome (Blandón-Gitlin et al., 
2014; Bond & DePaulo, 2006; DePaulo et al., 2003; van Vuuren, 2017).  
This study presented the veracity judges with transcribed of audio-recorded statements.  
The statement judges had no information about the statement provider(s), and particularly 
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relevant to this study no direct knowledge of whether the statements were provided by native-
language (first-language) speaker or non-native language (second language) speakers.  
Most deception research allows for reviewers to use various modalities to make veracity 
assessments. Reviewers often make use of an audio-visual modality or an audio modality. In 
these instances, veracity judges have access to more cues potentially such as subjective verbal 
and non-verbal cues to aid in their veracity assessments.  It has been found that at times these 
inferred cues are not based on actual cues associated with deception which then misleads the 
veracity judge and resulting in incorrect conclusions to the veracity of a statement (Carlucci et 
al., 2013; Vrij et al., 1999). This thesis restricted the communication between the statement 
provider and the statement veracity judge to the written modality only. This was done to restrict 
the ability of participants resorting to their own perceived cues to deception. Despite this 
manipulation, veracity assessment outcomes were still comparable to that of a chance outcome as 
is typically found in deception research (Bond, & DePaulo, 2006; DePaulo et al., 2003).  
Investigating the Presence of Bias 
This study postulated in hypothesis 1 that a lie bias would be present when statements, 
provided in a second language, are assessed for veracity. The converse was formulated for the 
second hypothesis that a truth bias would be present when first language statements are 
reviewed.  The results of the study do not support the hypothesis that a lie bias is extended to 
second language statements overall. Truthful second language statements, regardless of whether 
reviewed in a first or second language, are overall correctly assessed as truths and untrue second 
languages statements are overall incorrectly assessed as truths. 
In the case of first language statements and the presence of a truth bias, the study found 
that an overall truth bias was extended to all the statements, regardless of whether the statement 
was provided in a first or a second language. The study found that deceptive statements, whether 
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provided in a first and second language, were more likely to be incorrectly assessed as truthful 
whilst truthful statements were more likely be correctly assessed as truthful by the statement 
veracity judges.  
The outcomes of the investigations into bias in this empirical study is not aligned with the 
findings of literature that a lie bias is likely to be afforded to those speaking in their second 
language (Castillo, 2011; Cheng & Broadhurst, Da Silva & Leach, 2013; Evans & Michael, 
2014; Meissner & Kassin, 2002).  The only observation made regarding second language 
statements and the veracity judgment outcomes thereof, is that second language reviews of 
second language statements indicated a higher percentage of assessments being judged as lies 
compared to first language reviews of second language statements.  Despite this narrowing of the 
difference between judging statements preferentially as lies as opposed to truths, a greater 
number of statements are still, albeit marginally assessed as truths in this category. So, whilst an 
overall lie bias towards second language statements was not demonstrated, in the specific case of 
second language statements reviewed by a second language judge the overall observation of a 
truth judgment being extended to all statements is moderated in the case where second language 
statements are reviewed by second language reviewers. 
A future area of research should consider whether the results of this study is a result of 
the reviewer not being presented with any direct evidence of the language proficiency of the 
statement provider in respect to the statement language. The question can be asked whether 
knowledge of whether the statement language was provided in a first or second language would 
affect the veracity judges.   
This study then concludes that, as suggested by Levine (2014), that not only do people 
enter (verbal) conversation adopting a truth-default state but that this truth-default state is also 
adopted when written statements are reviewed. This study finds that when written statements are 
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reviewed, with no additional input to observe or characterise the provider of the statements, 
reviewers are still truth biased.  
This conclusion could be considered within Interpersonal Deception Theory and Truth-
Default Theory frameworks.  These frameworks hold that certain cognitive biases, such as visual 
and demeanour biases are present in veracity judging which influence veracity assessments, 
(Burgoon et al., 2008). Visual bias speaks to the reliance on non-verbal behaviour exhibited by 
speakers and the demeanour bias speaks to the communication style employed by the speaker 
(Burgoon et al., 2008). In this empirical study it was not possible for these biases to influence the 
veracity assessments as only written statements were being used to make veracity assessments. 
But this overall finding that a truth bias was still present despite these biases not being in play, 
suggests that this truth bias, which results from the truth-default state, is still in play when it 
comes to reviewing written statements.  
However, there is one nuance to this conclusion that requires further attention. The study 
did find that when considering whether statement veracity judges are reviewing statements in 
their native language or not has a bigger impact on the outcomes of the veracity assessments than 
whether the language was provided by a first or second language statement provider.  
No studies of second language statements, reviewed by a second language veracity judge 
was found in the literature review for this study. The international literature tends to limit the 
presence of a lie bias towards second language speakers, when they speak in their non-native 
tongue (Castillo, 2011; Cheng & Broadhurst, Da Silva & Leach, 2013; Evans & Michael, 2014; 
Meissner & Kassin, 2002). No distinction is made in literature accessed for this study regarding a 
review of a second language statement in a second language. To illustrate through means of a 
scenario, the question would be what factors would influence the veracity assessment when a 
first language isiXhosa speaker provides an English statement (i.e. a second language statement) 
and this statement is reviewed by an Afrikaans speaking first language reviewer (i.e. a second 
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language English reviewer)? This empirical study found that in this scenario the difference 
between correct and incorrect is moderated closer to chance than to the overall prevalence of an 
assessment of truth (aligned overall with the Truth Default Theory), This is an avenue of further 
enquiry to determine why this should be the case only for reviews conducted by second language 
reviewers.  
This study can therefore not conclude that a lie bias is generally exhibited towards second 
language speakers, as it is only within a smaller subset of the second language statements that 
some modification of the outcomes has been observed. Therefore, the findings of this study do 
not support the first hypothesis. 
The second line of enquiry pertaining to bias in this study was an investigating whether a 
truth bias was afforded to first language statements from first language reviewers (Hypothesis 2).  
The finding of this study that reviewers were generally truth biased (regardless of whether the 
statements being reviewed was in a first or second language) is in keeping with the assumptions 
as proposed by both Interpersonal Deception Theory and Truth-Default Theory – both theories 
argue that the receivers of the communication (in this case the reviewers) will be truth biased 
(Burgoon & Buller, 2014; Levine, Park, & McCornack, 1999; Levine, 2014). Studies argued that 
unless receivers of messages have a reason or experience an event that elicits a suspicion that 
deceit may be present, they will engage in the conversation assuming that the exchange is an 
honest on (Levine et al., 2010; Serota et al., 2010).   
Given the design of the study, with the statement generation and statement judging being 
decoupled and done in isolation of each other, the opportunity for receivers of the messages (the 
statement veracity judges) to assess the actual process of statement generation was not available 
to reviewers.  Results indicate that overall a truth bias was afforded to all statements and that 
there are not any significant differences between assessing either first or second language 
statements preferentially as truths. This contrasts with what Snelling (2013) and Solodukin 
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(2015), who found the greater one’s proficiency with the language i.e. was the language use at a 
first language level, the more likely it was deemed a truth.  
This study did find that the original statement veracity, in keeping with the veracity effect 
framework influenced the veracity judgment outcomes.  More truthful statements were judged to 
be true than deceptive statements correctly assessed as lies. This is in keeping with existing 
international literature in terms of the veracity effect. As the veracity effect posits that truths will 
show greater correct classification as compared to lies if one were to separate classification 
between truths and lies (Levine et al., 1999).   
To provide a more nuanced understanding of this overall truth bias, several post-hoc tests 
were conducted in this study. The post-hoc tests revealed that on average reviewers spent 31 
minutes on 56 questions (~ 6 minutes per statement).  It is proposed that this has contributed to 
the overall truth bias rating because it is indicative of heuristic processing being utilised to make 
veracity assessments. Heuristic processing is a mechanism through which decisions are made. 
This type of cognitive processing results in quick and rapid decision making and consumes little-
to-no cognitive effort (Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagley, 1989; Evans, 2007). Heuristic processing 
often biases the judgements being made, as compared to the slower, more cognitively demanding 
analytic processing (Buller, Burgoon, Afifi, White, & Buslig, 1997; Burgoon, Buller, Afifi, 
White, & Hamel, 2008; Fiedler, & Walka, 1993). It is likely that participants made use of 
heuristic processing as there was no real consequences to them identifying the statement as a 
deceptive one. Robust research on how people make decisions when it comes to deception 
argues that people have a very strong tendency to take people and by extension their statements 
at face value (Fein, & Hilton, 1994) and that this is only negated by the elicitation of suspicion 
(Gilbert, 1991). Without this elicitation of suspicion that the person may have an ulterior motive, 
quick and biased information processing may be active.  
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Therefore, it is speculated that participants utilised heuristic processing in this study, 
rather than analytical processing, as there was no consequence to themselves or providers of the 
statements which they deemed as being deceptive and they had relatively short pieces of text to 
analyse. According to a study conducted by Masip, Garrido, and Herrero (2009) people tended to 
use heuristic processing when they were analysing or rating brief communications. It is argued 
that this occurred in this study, as all participants had to review relatively short statements.  
Finally, this truth bias can be explained by how familiar the reviewer was with topic of 
the statement. Stiff, Miller, Sleight, Mongeau, Garlick and Rogan (1989) argued that as 
familiarity with the topic increased, the more likely it was the heuristic processing would be used 
when making veracity assessments. In this project, familiarity was proxied by the post-hoc test 
looking at how much the reviewer agreed with the sentiment expressed by the speaker.  The 
more a reviewer agreed with the sentiments expressed, the more likely the statement would be 
assessed as truthful. It is proposed that this is an example of confirmation bias that was present in 
some instances as people often seek out information to confirm their believes. If the reviewer 
believes that the statement is a truth because it is speaking to their belief system, they will 
actively seek out confirmatory information when making their veracity assessments.  
This overall truth bias could also potentially be explained from moral and social 
psychological perspectives. This line of reasoning argues that deception and lying is morally 
wrong, and this in turn feeds the principle of veracity. According to Bok (1999) the truth is 
always preferential barring certain special circumstances, and lying often requires a justification, 
where the truth requires no justification. Therefore, unless given reason to do so, people will not 
actively seek out the presence of deceit (Levine, Kim, & Hamel., 2010). Thus, people will 
typically act in accordance with the veracity principle, and many assume that others will as well. 
Hence, without a direct reason to suspect that the deceit is present, people will presume that 
others have no reason to lie, and therefore will not suspect the present of deceit (Levine et al., 
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2010; Gilbert, 1991).  In this particular study reviewers had no reason to actively suspect that the 
statement providers were instructed to lie, therefore, without the knowledge that the statement 
providers were asked to lie, they would have no reason to suspect deceit was present, and 
therefore, they would not think to question the veracity of the statement as anything other than 
honest.  
Overall this study found that statement reviewers, regardless of;  (a) whether statements 
were truthful or untruthful; (b) whether provided in a first or a second language; (c) whether the 
provided statement was under cognitive load or not, or (d) whether a statement was reviewed in a 
first or a second language, preferentially assessed the veracity of the statement as truthful.  
Overall, in the case of untruthful statements, 70.3% of the statements were incorrectly 
adjudicated to be truthful, and in the case of truthful statements, 73.9% was correctly assessed as 
truthful.  The overall study results agree with the truth bias concept as postulated in both 
Interpersonal Deception Theory and Truth-Default Theory. 
Impact of language proficiency on veracity adjudication. This study expected that the 
veracity assessment will differ dependent on whether the provided statement was a first or a 
second language statement.  For this study native versus non-native language were used as 
indicators of language proficiency.  
This study concludes that veracity assessment judgement outcomes are not affected by 
whether the statements were provided in a first or a second language if it the review was 
conducted in the native language of the reviewer. This study, counter to what was expected 
found that the judgement of statement veracities was overall more successful for statement 
veracity adjudicated by a second language judge compared to statements adjudicated by a first 
language judge. This was the case for both first and second language statements reviewed by a 
second language judge.  The veracity judgment outcomes for first language reviews of both first 
and second language statements was not much different than a chance outcome.  For first 
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language statements judged by first language reviewers 51.2% was correctly judged.  For first 
language reviews of second language statements, 49.1% was correctly judged. The results were 
different for second language reviews. The percentage of second language reviews of first 
language statements correctly assessed was 54% and for second language reviews of second 
language statements 56.2%.  In the case of first language statements adjudicated by a second 
language judge, the improvement in accuracy compared to first language adjudicators was not 
significant, only 2.8%.  However, in the case of second language statements adjudicated by a 
second language judge, the improvement in accuracy compared to first language adjudicators 
was significant at 7.1%.  
To provide more nuanced insights into this finding, a post-hoc assessment of reviewer’s 
perceptions of language proficiency was conducted. This post hoc assessment found that when 
reviewers perceived the language abilities of the statements to be that of a non-native speaker, 
the accuracy of correct versus incorrect veracity assessments were similar to a chance outcome. 
This was the case for both deceptive and truthful statements. When reviewers perceived the 
statement to have come from a native speaker there was a marked difference between the 
veracity assessments in favour of judging the statements as true (in keeping with the truth default 
theory).  Accepting for this argument that the perception of whether the statement was provided 
as a first or second language statement as proxy for language proficiency, would be in keeping 
with international studies by Snelling (2013) and Solodukin (2015), who found that the greater 
the language proficiency of the speakers, the greater the likelihood of it being assessed as a truth.  
Impact of Statement Veracity on Veracity Judgement.  
The fourth hypothesis of this study speculated that the original veracity of the statement 
would influence veracity assessments. The veracity effect was popularised by Levine and 
colleagues (1999), according to the veracity effect, if one separates overall detection rates by 
truth and lie, different picture emerges than the chance outcome as report by the bulk of 
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deception studies (Bond, & DePaulo, 2006; DePaulo et al., 2003). According to this effect, truths 
tended to be more correctly assessed as compared to lies (Levine et al, 1999). In keeping with 
Levine and colleagues (1999) the results of this study support the presence of the veracity effect. 
As can be seen in figure 2 page 73 in the case where original veracity was truthful, truths were 
more correctly identified compared to lie. In the case where original veracity was a lie, then 
overall original statement veracity did not improve accuracy. The exception to this observation 
was in the case of second language reviews of second language statements, where the difference 
between correct and incorrect assessments in the case of lies was Δ = 7.6%. Potential reasons 
offered for why the veracity effect exerts such an influence is because of heuristics. Levine et al., 
(1999) found that the more familiar the reviewer was the information being reviewed, the 
stronger the veracity effect, as was suggested by Stiff et al., (1989). In terms of this study, it is 
postulated that the veracity effect was present, not necessarily only due to how familiar (as 
measured by the extent of agreement with the speakers opinion) but also because, when 
reviewing statements, if the participants made use of heuristic processing they would not have to 
be methodical or analytical when it came to their assessments. 
The impact of Cognitive Load on Veracity Assessment  
The fifth hypothesis of the study was that participants would be better able to 
differentiate between truth-telling and lie-telling when cognitive load was imposed during 
statement generation. Past literature on the topic has shown that the introduction of cognitive 
load makes it harder to get away with deceit, and that the introduction improved detection 
accuracy (Blandón-Gitlin et al., 2014; Mann et al., 2002; Vrij, 2000; Walczyk et al., 2013). 
Contrary to this expectation, the accuracy of participants ability to discriminate between truthful 
and deceptive statements did not improve to above chance level when statements they were 
evaluating had been made under cognitive load. Half of the participants generating statements 
were placed under cognitive load.  The participants selected for providing statements under 
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cognitive load, were required to tap a finger in time with a metronome whilst giving their 
respective statements (both in the first and second language). As indicated in figure 2, the 
introduction of cognitive load did not improve the discriminability between truthful and deceitful 
statements at all, with only a 0.7% improvement in the percentage of correct veracity assessment 
outcomes achieved with the introduction of cognitive load. This is in contrast to several findings 
(Hartwig et al., 2006; Vrij, & Mann, 2006; Vrij et al., 2007; Vrij et al., 2015a). In the studies 
reported, the cognitive load included story-telling or reporting in reverse chronological order or 
asking unexpected questions during the statement generation.  This is likely because of the 
greater focus required from the participants to maintain the continuation of deceitful 
communication. It is speculated by the primary researcher that the amount of cognitive load 
induced on the participants of the reported studies was greater than the cognitive load imposed in 
the current study.  It is proposed that this is the reason for the contrary outcomes observed in this 
study when comparing the accuracy of veracity judgments of cognitive load statement against 
the veracity judgement outcomes of statements provided without cognitive load imposed.  It is 
important that a cognitive load task be chosen that taxes the sender (statement provider’s) 
sufficiently to make it difficult to engage in deceitful communication, but not too taxing to make 
statements incoherent. 
A different picture emerges from this study when the impact of cognitive load is assessed 
against the fixed effect attributes of first and second languages. When considering second 
language, untruthful statements, the introduction of cognitive load yielded unexpected outcomes 
in the veracity judgement of the statements.   
One would expect that there would be a better chance of discriminability between truthful 
and untruthful statements achieved with the introduction of cognitive load on second language 
statements, given that communicating in a non-native language (second language) is already 
inherently cognitively taxing as reported in published studies (Acka & Elkilic, 2011; Andila, 
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2003; Da Silva, 2011; Da Silva & Leach, 2003; Perani & Abutalebi, 2005; Ullman, 2001).   This 
inherent cognitive load in communicating in a second language whilst being deceptive stems 
from the premise that lying is a cognitively taxing activity on its own, as the deceiver must 
supress the truth, construct a credible story and continuously monitor that they are being 
perceived as credible (Evans & Michael, 2014). Add onto this already cognitively taxing task the 
fact that a sender now has to communicate in a second language, the availability or access to 
working memory is further reduced (Service et al., 2002).  This reduced access to working 
memory makes it more difficult to construct and maintain a credible story whilst being 
untruthful.   
This study found the converse, that there was a reduction in the percentage of correct 
outcomes for second language, untruthful statements under cognitive load reviewed by first 
language reviewers.  In the case of second language, untruthful statements under cognitive load 
reviewed by second language reviewers the number of correct outcomes increased for the 
statements assessed by second language reviewers. 
Human Evaluators and Computer Programme Detection Rates 
LIWC2015 a software programme that analyses text and reports statistics of word 
category use. In recent years, linguistic profiles using the reported LIWC word categories have 
been developed and used to successfully differentiate between truths and lies. This study 
investigated whether a computer programme, in this case LIWC2015 (Linguistic Inquiry and 
word Count, 2015 dictionary), would outperform human evaluators at correctly assessing truthful 
from untruthful statements (Hypothesis 6). Two published linguistic profiles where analysed 
using LIWC2015 generated profiles to assess whether one would perform better at differentiating 
between truthful and untruthful statements than the other.  The first of these linguistic profiles 
used word categories based on a natural language framework (NP profile) and is based on past 
literature in which LIWC was successfully used to differentiate between truth and lie (Newman 
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et al., 2003; Vrij, 2000). The second linguistic profile assessed was based on word categories 
used in a reality monitoring framework as proposed in 2005 by Bond and Lee. The Reality 
Monitoring framework performed better in correctly assessing the statement veracity compared 
to the NP framework which was based on past LIWC studies. It was expected that the veracity 
judgments using LIWC2015 generated language profiles analysed within published deceptive 
language profiles would perform significantly better at distinguishing between truthful and 
deceptive statements. However, in this study, although outperforming the human evaluators 
(50.4%), it was only slightly better than chance (53%). 
Although this is encouraging, that a reality monitoring framework can be coded into 
LIWC2015 and outperform human evaluators, it needs further investigation. One of the major 
criticisms that exists when using reality monitoring categories to detect deception, is the lack of 
consistency among empirical studies. For example, Sporer (1997) included the following reality 
monitoring categories; clarity, sensory experiences, emotions and feelings, spatial and time 
information, realism and story re-constructability and cognitive operations in order to 
discriminate between truths and lies. Whereas, in Vrij, Akehurst, Soukara, & Bull (2004) only 
used the following reality monitoring categories; spatial and temporal details, cognitive 
operations, auditory and visual details. Porter and Yuille (1996) found that reality monitoring 
could not successfully differentiate between truth and lie if the following categories were used; 
self-references, verbal hedges, pauses and word count.  
It should also be noted that past studies using LIWC to detect deceit, has often found that 
deceitful statements would contain fewer total number of words (Newman et al., 2003). 
However, this study could not consider this as a discriminating factor as all participants 
providing statements were instructed to provide three-minute long statements. This requirement 
of similar durations for verbal statements, whether truthful or untruthful resulted in similar length 
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statements. This is demonstrated in comparing the median word counts for truth statements (n = 
51) is 345 with lie statements (n = 51) is 340.   
The main results discussed only summarises the analysis performed against the two 
mentioned deceptive linguistic profiles.  Appendixes V and VI contains the full LIWC generated 
word categories and language profiles for all 102 English statements. 
Study Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research 
The design of the study called for the statement generation and statement veracity 
assessment phases to be consecutive.  This does not allow for any interaction between the 
statement provider and the statement veracity adjudicator, and therefore the simultaneous 
encoding and decoding happening between the two parties could not be assessed. As a result of 
this, the statement reviewer was never in a position to judge the sender of message and evaluate 
both verbal and non-verbal cues associated with deceit. This study only made use of 
undergraduate students to judge the veracity of a statement and as such the age distribution of 
participants were quite narrow and hence care should be taken to extrapolate the findings of this 
study to the broader population.  
This study was limited to written (transcribed) statements.  The study did not assess 
whether the outcomes would have been any different if the human evaluators listened to the 
statement providers, allowing the evaluators to form an opinion of the statement provider. It is 
proposed that a future study should account for this by comparing assessments of verbal 
statements against the transcribed statements.  
The outcome of the veracity assessments of statements provided under cognitive load is 
not in keeping with published studies. A future avenue of research should address the interplay 
between the cognitive load inherently induced by speaking a second language and an additional 
task imposed on the statement provider.  




This research was undertaken in order to determine if certain biases (namely a lie and 
truth bias) were extended to people when they gave statements in both their native and non-
native tongue.  Additionally, this study was done to determine if cognitive load facilitated the 
detection of deception in second language statements, and finally to see if a computer 
programme namely LIWC2015 outperformed human evaluators when it came to correct veracity 
assessment outcomes. 
This study was conducted in two phases, a statement generation phase (Phase 1) and then 
a statement review phase (Phase 2).  The study investigated whether biases are exhibited by 
statement evaluators toward second language statements.  This area of enquiry is appropriate in 
South Africa, where despite only 9.6% of the population identifies with English as a first 
language, English is the accepted lingua franca.  The initial results obtained by analysing the 
veracity judgement accuracy as a function of whether the statements were provided in first or 
second languages of the statement providers, did not indicate a clear differentiation between 
correct and incorrect assessments of the veracity assessment judges.  In order to understand the 
results presented in the study, it was required to broaden the area of investigation to also consider 
the correspondence between the statement language and the first language of the veracity judge.   
Overall, this study found that a truth bias was extended when reviewing written 
statements, confirming that people have a truth-default state as posited by Levine (2014) in his 
Truth-Default Theory. An overall lie bias towards statements provided in a second language of 
the statement provider could not empirically be demonstrated in this study. Results of the study 
were consistent with extant literature in terms of an overall truth bias, but the results were more 
marginal when restricting this assessment to the first language statements as required by the 
second research hypothesis.  The assessment of the overall dataset supports the premise behind 
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the veracity effect framework that holds that truthful statements are more likely to be assessed 
correctly as truths than deceptive statements are likely to be correctly assessed as lies.   
In contrast to what was expected the influence of cognitive load was not significant when 
assessed on the overall data set. However, when considering the smaller subset of the data 
representing cognitive load placed on second language statement providers. the effect of 
cognitive load is observed.  Finally, this study found that the software programme LIWC2015 
marginally outperformed human evaluators in making veracity assessments.  
This study found, in keeping with studies reported in the literature, that the veracity 
assessment outcomes overall was still close to a chance level outcome 
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Appendix I: Consent Form 1a 
Dear Student,  
Thank you for expressing interest to be part of in this study. This study seeks to 
determine whether statements made by first and second language speakers are treated differently 
by receivers of the communication.  
In order to do the analysis, we will ask you to specify your home (or first) language. 
Please note that you will be voice recorded in parts of the study. Furthermore, please note that 
your agreement to partake in the study is completely voluntary and that you may withdraw from 
the study at any given time, without any repercussions.  
The only information we require from you for this experiment is your student number for 
the data analysis part of this research project. Please also take note that all information gathered 
during this research project will be confidential in nature, and that your student number will not 
be made available to the public or used in any part of the final report. Please also note that the 
recordings of the second phase of the data collection will also be confidential in nature and not 
made available to the general public 
There are no foreseeable risks with this experience, and you should not experience any 
psychological distress nor stress and no harm should befall you. Should you wish to leave the 
study early, please inform the researcher and your data will be disregarded. You need not 
provide a reason, you simply need to ask for the data provided until your point of departure to be 
disregarded, and the data shall be disregarded and destroyed in the appropriate manner.  
Consent 
I hereby confirm that this phase of the experiment in which I voluntary partake has been 
explained to me and that I hereby give my informed consent to partake in the study. I understand 
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that my participation is voluntary and that I may withdraw my participation at any stage, without 
repercussions or penalty.  
Finally, I hereby confirm that I speak English at a first/second language level.  
Student Number: _______________________ 
Date:    _______________________ 
Signature:   _______________________ 
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Appendix II: Consent Form 1b 
Dear Student,  
Thank you for expressing your continued interest to be part of in this study. As explained 
before this study seeks to determine whether statements made by first and second language 
speakers are treated differently by receivers of the communication. In order to fully assess this 
question, we will need to ask whether there are natural biases exhibited by reviewers when they 
assess statements made in languages other than their own. 
In order to do this part of the analysis, we will ask you to provide a total of 4 3-minute 
statements on two of the topics you have responded to in phase 1a. Please note that for two of 
these statements we will ask you to be untruthful – to express a contrary view to that indicated 
during phase 1a. In essence we will require 2 truthful and two untruthful statements from you for 
phase 1b. We need the untruthful statements to assess whether it is possible to differentiate 
between truths and lies under different statement providing conditions as well as different 
statement receiving conditions. Please note that you will be voice recorded in parts of the study. 
Furthermore, please note that your agreement to partake in the study is completely voluntary and 
that you may withdraw from the study at any given time, without any repercussions.  
As before, please note that all information gathered to date and going forward should you 
consent is confidential. At no time will personal identification information be associated with 
any of the statements. Please be informed that the 4 will be transcribed for subsequent analysis of 
review panels during phase 2. No personal identification information of the statement providers 
will be available to the reviewers of the statements. 
There are no foreseeable risks with this experience, and you should not experience any 
psychological distress nor stress and no harm should befall you. However, the researcher 
acknowledges that you are being asked to be deceptive and this may cause you some 
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psychological distress or discomfort. Should this be of concern for you at this stage it is 
recommended that you withdraw. If you elect to continue and you develop some concerns or 
stress because of your participation you can contact student wellness at the following number 
(021) 650 1020/17. Should you wish to leave the study early, please inform the researcher and 
your data will be disregarded. You need not provide a reason, you simply need to ask for the data 
provided until your point of departure to be disregarded, and the data shall be disregarded and 
destroyed in the appropriate manner.  
Consent 
I hereby confirm that this phase (phase 1b) of the experiment in which I voluntary 
partake has been explained to me and that I hereby give my informed consent to partake in the 
study. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I may withdraw my participation 
at any stage, without repercussions or penalty.  
Finally, I hereby confirm that I speak English at a first/second language level.  
Student Number: _______________________ 
Date:    _______________________ 
Signature:   _______________________ 
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Appendix III: Consent Form 2 
Dear Student,  
Thank you for expressing interest and to partake in this study. This study seeks to 
investigate the notion of lie bias and second language as well as the influence of cognitive load 
on detecting deception. Please note that you during this stage you will be asked to make veracity 
judgements on pre-recorded and transcribed statements.  
The only information we require from you for this experiment is your student number for 
the data analysis part of this research project. Please also take note that all information gathered 
during this research project will be confidential in nature, and that your student number will not 
be made available to the public. Please also note that the recordings of the second phase of the 
data collection will also be confidential in nature.  
There are no foreseeable risks with this experience, and you should not experience any 
psychological distress nor stress and no harm should befall you. However, the researcher 
acknowledges that you are being made to be deceptive and this may cause you some 
psychological distress or discomfort. If this does happen to you can contact student wellness at 
the following number (021) 650 1020/17. Should you wish to leave the study early, please note 
the researcher may still keep and use the data that you provided till your voluntary withdrawal, 
however, if you explicitly ask for your data to be disregarded, the researcher shall do so. You 
need not provide a reason, you simply need to ask for the data provided until your point of 
departure to be disregarded, and the data shall be disregarded and destroyed in the appropriate 
manner.  
I hereby confirm that the experiment has been explained to me and that I hereby give my 
voluntary consent to partake in the study. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that 
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I may withdraw my participation at any stage, without penalty. Finally, I hereby confirm that I 
speak English at a first/second language level.  
Student Number: _______________________ 
Date:    _______________________ 
Signature:   _______________________ 
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Appendix IV: List of Topics 
1) The mother of an unborn child has the right to abort without the father’s consent. 
2) It is the government’s job to provide free education.  
3) Homosexual people do not have the right to get married.  
4) Military service should be mandatory for all 18-year-old male South Africans. 
5) Until South Africa addresses sport inequality, it should be banned from hosting World Cup 
sports events. 
6) South African citizens who are working overseas should pay the difference in the tax rates 
if it differs from the tax they would have been paying in South Africa, to support the 
economy. 
7) The Death Penalty is an appropriate punishment for crimes such as murder and rape. 
8) School children should not be allowed to attend schools that are not in the community in 
which they live. 
9) Assisted suicide should be allowed for the terminally ill if they request it, and if they are 
found to be fully cognisant of the fact that they are asking a physician to assist in ending 
their life, being aware that they are essentially asking to die?  
10) The legal age for the consumption of alcohol should be increased to 21 years. 
11) The speed limit on national roads should be reduced to 100 km/h to reduce the number of 
road accidents and to be more fuel efficient. 
12) No school assembly should be opened with prayer.  
13) English and Afrikaans need to be removed from the National Anthem of South Africa.  
14) The consumption of marijuana should be legalised in South Africa. 
15) The consumption of psychedelic drugs should be legalised at festivals, in South Africa.  
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Appendix V: LIWC word category summaries 
 
 
Figure 23 LIWC2015 Summary: Word Count 
Figure 22 LIWC2015 Summary: Language Attribute (grouped variables) Summaries 




Figure 24 LIWC2015 Summary: Linguistic Dimensions 






Figure 26 LIWC2015 Summary: Grammar categories 
Figure 25 LIWC2015 Summary: Affective Word Categories 
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Figure 28 LIWC2015 Summary: Social Attribute Word Categories 
Figure 27 LIWC2015 Summary: Cognitive Word Categories 







Figure 30 LIWC2015 Summary: Biological Word Categories 
Figure 29 LIWC2015 Summary: Perceptual Word Categories 






Figure 32 LIWC2015 Summary:  'Time Orientation' Word Categories 
Figure 31 LIWC2015 Summary: 'Drives' Word Categories 






Figure 34 LIWC2015 Summary: 'Personal Concerns' Word Categories 
Figure 33 LIWC2015 Summary: 'Relative' Word Categories 





Figure 35 LIWC2015 Summary: Informal Language Categories 
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Appendix V: LIWC (language grouped) word category summaries 
LIWC word categories presented as grouped by statements provided in a first or second 
language viewed against the presence (or not) of cognitive load. 
 
 
Figure 36 LIWC2015 (2x2 languages): Word Count 





Figure 37 LIWC2015 (2x2 languages): Language Attribute Summaries 





Figure 38 LIWC2015 (2x2 languages): Linguistic Dimensions 





Figure 39 LIWC2015 (2x2 languages): Grammar Word Categories 





Figure 40 LIWC2015 (2x2 languages): 'Affective' Word Categories 





Figure 41  LIWC2015 (2x2 languages): 'Social Attributes' Word Categories 




Figure  SEQ Figure \* ARABIC 35. Truth/Lie (2x2): Cognitive Word Categories i  42 LIWC2015 (2x2 languages): Cognitive Attributes' Word Categories 





Figure 43 LIWC2015 (2x2 languages): 'Perception' Word Categories 





Figure 44 LIWC2015 (2x2 languages): Biological Word Categories 





Figure 45 LIWC2015 (2x2 languages): 'Drives' Word Categories 





Figure 46 LIWC2015 (2x2 languages): 'Time Orientation' Word Categories 





Figure 47 LIWC2015 (2x2 languages): 'Relative' Word Categories 





Figure 48 LIWC2015 (2x2 languages): 'Personal Concerns' Word Categories 





Figure 49 LIWC2015 (2x2 languages): Informal Language Word Categories 
